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ABSTRACT 
This study is concerned with the over-representation of women in common 
psychiatric diagnoses and the role played by the mass media in promoting 
medicalized explanations of distress in women. In order to investigate this, the 
current study examines the various constructions of distress used in the women’s 
magazine ‘Take a Break’. This magazine was chosen because of its popularity 
and because the readership reflects those women who are demographically most 
over-represented in common psychiatric diagnoses. In order to investigate the 
constructions of distress used in the magazine, the study draws on discursive 
psychology and critical discourse analysis to examine how particular 
constructions of distress are employed and to what effect. The key constructions 
identified in the data were ‘distress as a normative response’, ‘distress as a 
biomedical condition’ and ‘distress as a matter of personal responsibility’. The 
implications of each of these representations of distress are explicitly reflected 
upon with reference to the literature, and recommendations for clinical practice 
and further research are made in light of the findings. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this section I will begin with a brief literature review in order to summarise 
research findings on gender and psychiatric diagnosis. Firstly, I will present the 
epidemiological evidence to support the overrepresentation of women in common 
psychiatric diagnoses. I will then go on to summarise the key explanatory 
frameworks postulated in the literature to account for these gender differences. I 
will then critique these accounts using a social constructionist approach, which 
argues that psychiatric diagnoses are socially constructed and unique to time and 
culture, rather than being a ‘real’ physical entity.  
I will then go on to argue that the mass media is a powerful tool in promoting 
particular conceptualisations of distress. To illustrate this argument I will draw on 
examples in the literature where mass media has been used to promote or 
market psychiatric explanations of distress to women and I will reflect on the 
potential implications of this. I will then go on to discuss the relevance of this to 
Clinical Psychology and will subsequently outline my research aims.  
1.1. Gender and Psychiatric Diagnosis 
1.1.1. Women and Mental Health: Epidemiological Findings 
 
It is widely reported in the literature that overall rates of ‘mental disorder’ are 
identical in men and women (Kessler et al, 1994; Rosenfield & Smith, 2010). 
Despite similar overall rates, the profiles of psychopathology are reported to 
differ, with women accounting for more of the ‘common mental health problems’ 
such as mood and anxiety ‘disorders’ whilst men show higher rates of psychotic 
and substance misuse ‘disorders’ (Kessler et al, 1994; Rosenfield & Smith, 
2010). 
Evidence suggests that comorbidity between anxiety and depression is high 
(Astbury, 2001; Kessler et al, 1994), however, women are more likely than men 
to receive a diagnosis of either anxiety or depression alone, as well as being 
more likely than men to receive a comorbid diagnosis (Kessler, 1994; Linzer et al 
1996; Simonds & Whiffen, 2003). 
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Specifically, women’s increased rates of depression relative to men have become 
one of the most consistent findings in psychiatric epidemiology. This was 
highlighted by Kessler et al (1994) in the US National Comorbidity Survey, but 
has also been demonstrated by a number of other research studies utilising both 
clinical and community samples (Linzer et al, 1996; Williams et al, 1995). Further 
research has also found this phenomenon to exist across a wide range of cultural 
contexts (Piccinelli & Homen, 1997; Seedat et al, 2009; WHO & ICPE, 2000). 
1.1.2. Which Women are Most at Risk? 
 
Due to the particularly large gender differences seen in the diagnosis of 
depression this area has been extensively researched. Several studies have 
found that adult women are most over-represented in depression diagnoses with 
smaller differences in children and older adults (Bebbington, 1998; Kessler et al, 
1993; Kessler et al, 1994). The exact age range varies between studies, but there 
appears to be a general consensus that women are most over-represented 
between early adolescence and the mid-50s (Bebbington, 1998; Kessler et al, 
1993; Kornstein & Wojcik, 2002). In addition, marriage and motherhood further 
increase a woman’s risk of receiving a depression diagnosis (Gove, 1972; 
Piccinelli & Wilkinson, 2000), with young mothers with small children being at 
particularly high risk (Bebbington et al., 1981a; 1984; Paykel, 2005).  
Whilst much of the literature focuses on depression, evidence suggests that the 
overrepresentation of women in other psychiatric categories may be mediated by 
similar risk factors. Simoni-Wastilla (2000) found that women between the ages 
of 25 and 34 were being prescribed the greatest amount of psychotropic 
medication. However, they also found a peak of drug prescription for those over 
the age of 65. In addition they found that precise age differences could be seen 
depending on which drug was being examined. Whilst middle-aged women were 
most likely to be prescribed anxiolytic drugs, women below the age of 35 were 
more likely to be prescribed narcotic-based drugs.  
Astbury (2001) also highlighted the added pressures experienced by lone 
mothers, and reported that even in developed countries lone mothers were most 
likely to be living in poverty (Belle, 1990) and most likely to suffer from poor 
physical and mental health outcomes (Belle, 1990; Lipman, Offord & Boyle, 
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1997). Research also suggests that low socioeconomic status is a risk factor for 
poor mental health irrespective of parenthood (Hudson, 2005; Kessler et al, 
1994).  
In line with this evidence, employment appears to be a protective factor against 
poor mental health. Simoni-Wastila (2000) reported that women in employment 
were significantly less likely to be prescribed psychotropic drugs. Astbury (2001) 
reports that rank in the workplace is predictive of depression, with those at the 
lowest work grades reporting the highest rates of depression. This may well have 
implications for women, who have consistently lower employment rates than men 
and who also occupy fewer professional roles and earn consistently less (Office 
of National Statistics, 2013). This may suggest that women from lower 
socioeconomic status backgrounds may be at greater risk of receiving a mental 
health diagnosis. 
1.1.3. Explanations for Gender Differences in Common Psychiatric Diagnoses 
 
The gender differences in psychiatric diagnoses are striking and many 
explanations have been theorised and researched. Given the particular research 
focus on the over-representation of depression in women, much of the research 
focuses on this area in particular. Below is a brief summary of the literature which 
attempts to create a better understanding of these striking epidemiological 
findings.  
1.1.3.1. Biology 
 
Biological differences are often posited as a reason for differential diagnosis 
rates. The most common biomedical explanation for women’s higher rates of 
anxiety and depression is reproductive hormones. This theory has been justified 
through the apparent link between anxiety and depression and periods of 
hormonal flux (Solomon & Herman, 2009). In particular, researchers have noted 
the association between the onset of depression and/or anxiety and puberty 
(Angold et al., 1998; Parker & Brotchie, 2004; Peterson et al., 1991), and the lack 
of gender discrepancy in anxiety and depression post-menopause (Bebbington et 
al., 1998; Kessler et al., 1993). Some researchers have also argued that the 
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cross-cultural nature of gender differences in depression is indicative of biological 
causes (Altemus, 2003).   
1.1.3.2. Social Roles 
 
The socialisation of girls and women into particular roles has also been presented 
as an explanation for higher rates of female depression. As mentioned 
previously, the largest gender differences seen in depression exist in adulthood 
(Bebbington, 1998; Kessler et al, 1993; Kessler et al, 1994). Whilst it can be 
argued that girls (and boys) are socialised into particular roles from very early on, 
Nolen-Hoeksema and Girgus (1994) suggest that a process of ‘gender 
intensification’ occurs at puberty. This involves girls being consigned to limited 
social roles, which, if rejected, could result in rejection of girls by boys.  
Astbury (2001) suggests that the higher levels of depression reported in female 
adulthood may reflect the triple burden carried by adult women, including the 
burden of reproductive, productive and caring work. The gendered psychological 
effects associated with marriage is a well-researched area in relation to this 
theory, with marriage acting as a risk factor for mental health problems in women 
and a protective factor for men (Dennerstein et al, 1993). Whilst this finding has 
been demonstrated to be inconsistent across cultural groups (Russo, 1990), it 
has been argued that it could indicate that the higher levels of distress found in 
adult women may be related, at least in part, to the social expectations placed 
upon them as wives and mothers in particular cultural and socio-political 
contexts. 
As highlighted above, research has also demonstrated that women caring for 
young children may be at particular risk of depression (Brown & Harris, 1978). 
Belle Doucet (2003) found that those experiencing poverty were also more 
susceptible to depression. This echoes a much wider body of research which 
demonstrates the link between social inequality and poorer physical and mental 
health (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010). These two risk factors may well be linked, as 
even in developed countries lone mothers are the largest group of people living in 
poverty (Belle, 1990).  
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Whilst most of the research in this area focuses on depression rather than other 
common psychiatric diagnoses such as anxiety and somatoform disorders, it is 
possible that similar mechanisms underlie distress. However, Zalta and 
Chambless (2012) suggest an additional mechanism that may influence female 
anxiety. They argue that due to gender socialisation, girls have fewer 
opportunities to experience mastery in their learning than boys, and that it is this 
lack of mastery that results in high levels of female anxiety in relation to anxiety in 
boys.  
1.1.3.3. Cognitive Style and Personality Characteristics  
 
It has been suggested by some that the role of adverse life events in causing 
depression is mediated by individual cognitive styles and vulnerability (Piccinelli & 
Wilkinson, 2000). Specifically, research suggests that the way in which an 
individual copes with an initial lowering in mood is key to depression. According 
to Nolen-Hoeksema et al (1999), men have a tendency to distract themselves 
from low mood, whereas women are less active in their coping and are more 
likely to ruminate. It has been suggested that rumination is a less effective coping 
strategy than taking some form of action, and thus could leave an individual at 
greater risk of depression (Hänninen & Aro, 1996; Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson, and 
Grayson, 1999). 
Research has also been used to argue that particular personality characteristics 
associated more strongly with women are helpful in understanding depression 
rates in women. Goodwin and Gotlib (2004) found that levels of ‘neuroticism’ 
were significantly higher among females, and suggested that this characteristic 
may play a role in mediating depression.  
1.1.3.4. Health-Seeking Behaviour 
 
According to the literature, women are more likely than men to report 
psychological symptoms and to seek help (Leong & Zachar, 1999; Mackenzie, 
Gekoski & Knox, 2006; Oliver et al, 2005). It has been suggested that women’s 
higher mental and physical morbidity might be related to sensitivity to physical 
cues or the greater social acceptability for women to seek help (Sen et al, 2002). 
Interestingly, Kessler et al (1981) found that women were more likely than men to 
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seek medical help when experiencing similar levels of distress, and that this 
appeared to be related women’s readiness to conceptualise feelings of distress 
as a recognised emotional problem.    
1.1.3.5. Job Inequality and Discrimination  
 
Women in paid work receive significantly lower wages than their male 
counterparts, and whilst the pay gap varies between countries, women in the UK 
in 2013 typically earned 19.7% less than their male counterparts per hour 
(Department for Culture, Media & Sport, 2014). Women are also more likely to 
occupy lower-status jobs associated with less autonomy (Stansfeld et al, 1998). 
This is relevant to the distress of women as jobs associated with a lack of control 
or autonomous decision-making are associated with higher levels of physical and 
mental illness (DoH, 1998; Stansfeld et al, 1998). In addition women also engage 
in far greater levels of unpaid domestic and caring work in the home or 
community which is likely to contribute to distress (Astbury, 2001).  
1.1.3.6. Social Rank 
 
In the National US Comorbidity Survery (1994), Kessler et al found that most 
psychiatric disorders declined with higher socioeconomic status, which is 
consistent with a body of research into risk factors for psychiatric diagnosis (DoH, 
1998; Patel et al, 1999; Saraceno, 1997; WHO, 2001). Whilst the link between 
socioeconomic status and psychological wellbeing has been well established in 
the literature, much of this research lacks a gender perspective (Astbury, 2001). 
However, in the 1998 ‘Independent inquiry into inequalities in health’, the 
Department of Health highlight some of the inequalities experienced by women, 
including poorer psychosocial health and higher rates of anxiety and depression. 
Attention is also drawn to the importance of intersectionality between gender, 
socioeconomic status, motherhood and ethnicity (DoH, 1998). Whilst much of this 
research lacks a gendered perspective, it can be deduced that if women are 
subject to greater levels of social disadvantage (as discussed above), and social 
disadvantage is associated with poorer psychological outcomes, that women may 
experience poorer outcomes as a result of this disadvantage. This is 
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corroborated by the DoH’s (1998) finding that women of lower socioeconomic 
status are at higher risk.  
Whilst material indicators of social disadvantage are important to consider, it is 
also worth noting the significance of conceptual ideas about social rank. Astbury 
(2001) argues that issues of social rank also operate on a symbolic level, with 
each person having an awareness of their social position in relation to others. 
Importantly, the ‘symptoms’ of depression can be seen to overlap considerably 
with the qualities experienced in relation to low social rank. For example, 
experiencing oneself as inferior, behaving in unassertive ways, and experiencing 
a sense of defeat. Furthermore, from a gendered perspective, these very 
qualities have significant overlap with societal and cultural expectations of 
femininity (Astbury, 2001).  
1.1.3.7. Gender-Based Violence 
 
The prevalence of violence against girls and women is alarmingly high (WHO, 
1998; WHO 2001; WHO, 2002). Girls are far more likely to be victims of 
childhood sexual abuse than boys (WHO, 2002) and women are far more likely to 
be victims of intimate partner violence perpetrated by men (Kessler et al, 1995; 
WHO, 2001). This is of particular relevance to the field of mental and physical 
health as violence against girls and women has been linked to a vast number of 
mental health problems (Astbury, 2001; Humphreys, 2007; Ussher, 2010), 
including depression, anxiety, substance abuse, dissociative disorders and post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Pico-Alfonso et al, 2006; Roberts et al, 1998) 
and physical health problems (Humphreys, 2007).  
1.2. Critique of the Evidence: A Social Constructionist Approach 
Ussher (2010) argues that the various arguments provided above are “at best, 
partial, and at worst, deeply flawed analyses” (p. 20). Specifically she argues that 
whilst these explanations vary widely in the way in which depression is 
understood, they all posit that it is an existing pathology within the woman, 
whether this results from a biological or social cause (Ussher, 2010). The same 
argument can be made for the conceptualisation of anxiety or any other 
psychiatric explanation. It is important to note that the explanations do vary a 
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great deal with regards to the extent to which they consider social context and 
gender inequality, but that even very contextualised accounts make little attempt 
to question the validity of the concept of ‘depression’ or other psychiatric 
diagnoses.  
These explanations are therefore based on the assumption that a psychiatric 
disorder is a naturally occurring pathology existing in the diagnosed individual 
(Pilgrim & Bentall, 1999; Ussher, 2010). This epistemological position is 
understood as a ‘realist’ or ‘positivist’ position, and within a positivist framework, it 
is assumed that these identified ‘disorders’ or ‘pathologies’ can be studied with 
increasing sophistication aligned with the progress of science, resulting in a more 
and more accurate description of reality (Burr, 2003; Pilgrim & Bentall, 1999). A 
range of critics of the realist approach to psychiatric disorder argue that the lack 
of physical evidence in psychiatry renders psychiatric disorders as problematic at 
best and completely mythical at worst (Pilgrim & Bentall, 1999; Rapley et al, 
2011). Indeed, Rapley, Moncrieff and Dillon (2011) draw attention to that fact that 
after over 100 years of research into the physical pathology at the root of mental 
disorder, we are still no closer to identifying or understanding any organic or 
physical causes of human misery. 
An alternative to the positivist approach to psychiatric diagnosis is a social 
constructionist approach (Burr, 2003). Social constructionism adopts a critical 
stance towards our ‘taken-for-granted’ knowledge or understanding about the 
world, and suggests that the categories by which we understand the world do not 
necessarily refer to real divisions (Burr, 2003). Within a social constructionist 
framework, it is suggested that the way we understand the world is particular to a 
specific time and culture (Burr, 2003). Importantly, therefore, our accepted 
knowledge about the world does not result from direct and objective observation 
of reality, but rather results from our observations of the constant daily 
interactions between people in social life. People within a particular time and 
culture construct what is experienced as reality between them through social 
interaction and in particular, language (Burr, 2003).  
This approach therefore represents a complete contrast to the positivist approach 
taken in medicine and psychiatry which proposes that mental disorder is a pre-
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existing organic pathology that has been discovered and exists independently of 
time, place or cultural context. With regards to psychiatric diagnosis, therefore, a 
social constructionist approach postulates that such disorders are socially 
constructed phenomena as opposed to ‘real’ existing organic entities (Ussher, 
2010).  
1.2.1. The Case for a Social Constructionist Approach 
 
One way in which the case for social constructionism is made is through the 
examination of historical and cross-cultural accounts of particular concepts. 
Historical accounts of madness or psychiatric diagnosis illustrate the way in 
which our understanding has varied according to the political and social context 
of the time. Similarly, when looking at cross-cultural accounts, it is evident that 
psychiatric diagnosis is very much a Western concept as opposed to a universal 
understanding (Summerfield, 2001; Ussher, 2010; White & Marsella, 1982).  
1.2.1.1. A Historical Account 
 
Early madhouses were confining those considered deviant in gradually increasing 
numbers due to reduced tolerance of bizarre or deviant behaviour in the context 
of industrial and technological changes and an increasingly capitalist society 
(Scull, 1979). At the time these were not monopolised by any particular 
professional group but the business was a lucrative one. Several different 
professional groups were vying for leadership and control in relation to the mad. 
However, doctors had an advantage when it came to claims of curing insanity 
due to their professional status and acknowledged power and success in treating 
ailments (Scull, 1979). During the nineteenth century doctors therefore applied a 
range of strategies (including lectures, written literature and a push towards 
placing apothecaries and visiting physicians into current institutions)  to secure 
public acceptance of their view of madness as an illness (Scull, 1979).  
During this time positivism and Darwinian ideas about evolution were extremely 
popular, and psychiatrists needed to establish their place as a ‘hard’ biomedical 
science in order to establish public respect for the profession (Porter, 2002). 
Whilst many contributed to the establishment of psychiatric nosology, it was the 
work of Kraepelin that established widely accepted notions of psychiatric 
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categories (Pilgrim & Bentall, 1999; Porter, 2002; Ussher, 2010). Before this time 
throughout the ages a range of different explanations for distress had been 
widely accepted, including spirit possession, witchcraft, or physical explanations 
such as imbalance of chemicals in the body or infections. Importantly, before the 
end of the eighteenth century, doctors viewed a patient’s emotional and spiritual 
life as directly relevant to their ill health, and the illness was not thought to exist 
independently of the person (Radley, 1994). It was only in the early twentieth 
century that depression became a widely used term and became reified as a 
disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (Kirk & 
Kutchings, 1992).  
Interestingly, the further construction of asylums and the employment of doctors 
to treat those considered insane during the nineteenth century led to a rapid 
increase in the number of certified ‘lunatics’. In 1844 there were 12.66 certified 
cases of mental illness per 10,000 people, and by 1890, this figure was 29.6 per 
10,000 (Scull, 1979). Foucault (1965) argues that the language used to construct 
madness defines madness and the way it is manifested. In other words, in 
relation to the huge increase in mentally ill, the Foucauldian argument would 
suggest that once the discourse of madness has entered the minds of the 
population, it becomes a legitimate way for misery to be communicated, and that 
this can be manifested both psychologically and physically, leading to a 
subsequent increase in cases.  
Clearly, particular social constructions or accepted knowledge were associated 
with particular responses. Early assumptions dictated that the mad were ‘like wild 
beasts’ that needed ‘brutal taming’. This included the use of instruments such as 
whips and chains (Porter, 2002). Other strategies used included physical 
restraint, bloodletting and purging and vomiting (Porter, 2002). Later, in the first 
half of the twentieth century, electro-convulsive shock therapy and insulin-coma 
therapy were introduced and quickly gained popularity. It has been argued that 
these approaches were embraced due to their ability to confirm the medical and 
scientific nature of psychiatry (Moncrieff, 2011). The first half of the twentieth 
century also saw the introduction of psychopharmacology (Ussher, 2010). 
However, despite seemingly conflicting epistemological positions, psychiatry in 
the 1940s-1960s was also heavily influenced by psychoanalysis. This saw 
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diagnoses of hysteria and nervous conditions being applied primarily to women 
(Ussher, 2010). Finally in the 1970s the pressure for psychiatry to establish itself 
as a ‘hard’ science based on evidence-based principles increased, largely due to 
the poor diagnostic reliability associated with the DSM-II (Davies, 2013). This led 
to a rejection of psychoanalytic ideas and the firm establishment of biological 
explanations for psychological distress (Ussher, 2010). 
From a feminist perspective, madness has long been associated with femininity 
(Meyer, Fallah & Wood 2011), and the early days of psychiatry have been heavily 
critiqued for widely denigrating female intellect (Porter, 2002). Women were also 
more likely to be labelled as hysterical or maladjusted and were also more likely 
to be forced to submit themselves for professional assessment by a psychiatrist 
or psychologist (Russell, 1995).  
Importantly, social constructionism dictates that this passage from one 
understanding to another does not represent a progression from obscure or 
ignorant conceptions to a final realisation of the ‘truth’ about madness (Burr, 
2003). Rather, different understandings appear to manifest according to social 
and political contexts and appear to perform particular social tasks. 
1.2.1.2. A Cross-Cultural Account 
 
In the same way that madness or distress have been conceptualised in different 
ways in Western societies over time, there is also extensive evidence to suggest 
the way in which emotional states and misery are conceptualised and 
experienced vary hugely between different societies. Across different languages 
words can be found for emotional concepts that do not translate directly to other 
languages, suggesting that emotional experience is socially constructed rather 
than universal (Burr, 2003). 
Similarly, the terms used to describe some kind of mental distress also vary 
hugely, as do the explanatory frameworks or understandings behind them. As 
highlighted by Ussher (2010), Marecek (2006) demonstrates this by highlighting 
some of the ways in which distress is signified in other communities, such as 
burning sensations on the soles of one’s feet in Sri Lanka, and ants crawling 
inside the head in Nigeria. In Iran a variety of social problems, such as poverty or 
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family conflicts, are understood to lead to a condition called “heart distress”, 
which is described as abnormality or disturbance of normal heart function (Good 
& Good, 1982).  
These cross-cultural differences have long presented a problem to Western 
psychiatry. Historically, patterns of behaviour unique to a particular cultural group 
were termed ‘culture-bound syndromes’ when they did not fit with Western 
conceptualisations of psychiatric disorder (Littlewood, 1990). This has since been 
widely critiqued on the basis that all distress reactions can be seen as culturally 
determined. For example, overdoses and anorexia nervosa are arguably an 
artefact of Western culture (Littlewood 1990; Littlewood & Lipsedge, 1987).  
Over time there has been an increase in conformity to Western 
conceptualisations of distress cross-culturally (Littlewood, 1986). Rather than 
representing scientific progress towards discovering ‘the truth’, this can be seen 
as a direct result of the increasing dominance of professional western medicine in 
a context of more general economic and social transformation associated with 
capitalism (Littlewood, 1990).  
Consistent with a social constructionist approach, White and Marsella (1982) 
argue that in much of the cross-cultural research there has been inadequate 
attention paid to the power of language used in social contexts and the extent to 
which illness terms and concepts are embedded in wider cultural systems of 
knowledge about social behaviour.  
1.2.2. Why are Cultural Conceptions of Distress Important? 
 
Cultural concepts are hugely important, as the way in which we understand 
people and the world will inevitably have a direct impact on the way we act or 
respond. In order to illustrate this point, Burr (2010) uses an example of ‘drunks’, 
who, before the Temperance movement, were seen as wholly responsible for 
their behaviour and were therefore imprisoned as a response. Later 
understandings of drunkenness moved towards an alcoholic explanation, where 
the individual is seen as having a sickness or addiction for which they are not 
entirely responsible. The response therefore changed, with a greater focus on 
medical or psychological treatment or rehabilitation (Burr, 2010).  
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Our understood knowledge and social action therefore go hand-in-hand (Burr, 
2010), and this is of importance and relevance with regards to psychiatric 
diagnosis. As described above, historical conceptions of madness have at times 
legitimised extremely brutal treatment. It is therefore important to consider what 
actions are currently allowed and legitimised through our current understanding 
of distress as psychiatric disorder. Moncrieff (2011) suggests that psychotropic 
medication, rather than targeting specific disease pathways or abnormalities, 
instead simply creates an alternative experiential state (such as sedation). 
However, millions of people around the world have been convinced that they are 
experiencing a brain disorder which can be corrected through the use of 
psychotropic medication (Moncrieff, 2011). Moncrieff (2011) goes on to argue 
that this idea is based on marketing tactics of pharmaceutical companies and the 
need for psychiatry to maintain its professional power. The implications of this are 
that people are being prescribed drugs that are simply supressing or disguising 
their distress (Moncrieff, 2011), thus avoiding the need to examine the root 
causes (Boyle, 2011).  
Whilst psychiatric treatment can therefore be seen to propagate an avoidance of 
examining the social and political determinants of distress, it is also important to 
consider the direct impact of medication on individuals. Price, Cole and Goodwin 
(2009) found that SSRI anti-depressant medication caused a wide variety of 
unwanted emotional side-effects in users. These included feelings of numbness 
and a reduction in positive emotions such as happiness, enjoyment, excitement 
and love; feelings of detachment from loved ones including to partners and 
children; feelings of indifference about things that used to matter and personality 
changes. In addition, anti-depressants are well documented to be associated with 
a whole host of other unwanted side-effects. On the NHS information website 
(NHS Choices, n.d.) it lists ‘common’ side-effects associated with SSRIs and 
these include ‘feeling agitated, shaky or anxious, feeling or being sick, indigestion 
and stomach aches, diarrhoea or constipation, loss of appetite,  dizziness, 
insomnia or feeling very sleepy, headaches’ and a variety of sexual problems 
including low sex drive and difficulty reaching orgasm. Less common side-effects 
listed include self-harm and suicidality, seizures, fever, irregular heartbeat, 
unconsciousness or coma. Side-effects of other medications have similarly 
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unpleasant and worrying side-effect profiles. For example, anti-psychotic drugs 
are commonly associated with a range of problems including constipation, weight 
gain, high blood pressure, increased risk of diabetes and reduced life 
expectancy, to name a few (Bentall, 2010).  
Whilst much of this section has focused on psychiatric diagnosis and treatment, it 
is important to also deconstruct the way in which Clinical Psychology as a 
discipline constructs distress and what action this allows or inhibits. Whilst as a 
discipline Clinical Psychology aims to explore sociocultural determinants of 
distress, it is still arguably complicit with the concept of psychiatric disorder. Boyle 
(1997) suggests that this collusion occurs in a number of different ways. Firstly, 
Clinical Psychology can be seen to adopt a theoretically medical framework 
which substitutes physical pathologies such as bacteria or tumours with 
unwanted psychological attributes such as ‘thinking errors’ or ‘cognitive biases’, 
or pathological personality characteristics such as ‘neuroticism’.  Secondly, whilst 
Clinical Psychology may not explicitly embrace the use of psychiatric diagnoses, 
it rarely challenges their use, and serves to validate this way of categorising 
implicitly by organising research using diagnostic groups and referring to 
diagnosis in psychology textbooks (Boyle, 1997). In addition, psychological 
services are often created around the diagnostic system and the type of 
psychiatric diagnosis given can limit the kind of psychological intervention on 
offer to an individual. Finally, the practice of Clinical Psychology continues to 
focus primarily on pathological individuals as opposed to pathological social 
structures which echoes a medical framework (Boyle, 1997).   
By colluding with this psychiatric framework, Clinical Psychology perpetuates 
individualistic and pathologising accounts of distress. Boyle (2011) argues that 
this rhetoric of objective symptoms and of science serves two key functions. The 
first, she argues, relates to psychology’s insecurity about its academic and social 
acceptance as a science. In order to establish itself securely within this 
framework, psychology therefore identifies with and superficially imitates 
disciplines such as physics, biology and medicine, whose scientific status is 
perceived as more secure (Boyle, 2011). Secondly, and in relation to the previous 
point, Boyle (2011) argues that psychology is invested in avoiding accusations of 
social and political bias, and aims to be seen as seeking the truth as opposed to 
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being influenced by values. In Boyle’s words, psychology is therefore ‘much more 
comfortable talking about brains and minds than about poverty, sexual violence 
and racial oppression.’ Boyle (2011) suggests that this also has the added 
advantage of avoiding implicating those in power (such as governments, 
corporations or men) as having a causal role in distress, which might create a 
retaliation of some kind or threaten their professional position. 
Cultural conceptualisations of distress have also been of great relevance to 
feminist critics, who have long argued that the gender differences in diagnosis 
serve a function of pathologising women in particular and legitimising the 
regulation of women’s behaviour (Ussher, 1991; Ussher, 2010).  
1.2.3. A Feminist Perspective 
 
As highlighted by Ussher (2010), feminist critics have long maintained a critical 
view of psychiatry and the medicalization of female distress (Marecek, 2006; 
Stoppard, 2000; Ussher, 1991). It has also been argued that the guise of science 
and discourse of biology and medicine has been used to mask or ignore the 
social and political context to distress (Stoppard 2000; Ussher, 1991; 2010).  
Unsurprisingly, biological explanations of female depression have received 
extensive criticism (Ussher, 2010). Critics argue that an unwarranted scrutiny of 
the relationship between women’s reproductive functioning and their mental 
health has skewed the research agenda (Astbury, 2001), suggesting that 
research evidence in fact indicates that the effect of biology on a woman’s mental 
health is mediated by, and in many cases disappears entirely, when psychosocial 
factors are taken into account (Astbury, 2001). For example, Dennerstein, Dudley 
and Burger (1997) found that emotional wellbeing in middle aged women was 
positively associated with their general health status, psychosocial and lifestyle 
variables, and not with their menopausal status or hormone levels. In relation to 
female depression in adolescents, life events and the interaction between 
oestrogen and life events have been found to explain four times the variance 
(17%) in depression compared to oestrogen alone (4%) (Brooks-Gunn & Warren, 
1989).  
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Psychological explanations for depression in women have also been subject to 
feminist critique. As mentioned previously, some theorists have claimed that it is 
women’s response to stress or adversity which leads to depression. Specifically, 
women are seen as having a tendency to ruminate as opposed to actively 
problem-solving (Hänninen & Aro, 1996; Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson & Grayson, 
1999). Boyle (1997) argues that such explanations serve to position women as 
more ‘vulnerable’ or ‘weak’ than men. Boyle (1997) suggests that these 
explanations are more consistent with the dominant scientific and cultural 
paradigm and are thus more acceptable than exploring or acknowledging political 
factors and sexual inequality.  
Given the problematic nature of psychiatric and psychological explanations for 
the over-representation of women in common mental health problems, Lafrance 
and Stoppard (2006) argue that the current dominant psychiatric and 
psychological discourses of women’s depression are individualistic, and based 
upon an implicit assumption of relative gender equality with the exception of 
specific biological and cognitive processes. Whilst more contextualised accounts 
of women’s misery or distress are also available in the literature these are often 
side-lined or excluded from the mainstream. For example, in a review on the 
over-representation of women in depression, Piccinelli and Wilkinson (2000) 
simultaneously acknowledge and negate particular social or political factors. In a 
section on early adverse experiences, it is acknowledged that whilst women are 
more likely to have experienced certain adverse childhood events such as sexual 
abuse, they are also ‘more sensitive to their depressogenic effects’ (Piccinelli & 
Wilkinson, 2000). This can be seen to maintain an individualistic view of 
depression and a discourse of female vulnerability.   
1.3. Conceptions of Women’s Distress: The Role of the Media 
We have discussed the socially constructed nature of distress, and the way in 
which our experiences are shaped and cultivated by the cultural scripts we have 
available to us. By referring to historical and cultural accounts we have seen that 
the way distress or madness has been conceptualised varies according to time, 
place, culture and socio-political context.  
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There is extensive evidence to suggest that women’s distress is being 
conceptualised as psychiatric in nature both by women themselves and by 
professionals and wider society. For example, as quoted in the first section of this 
thesis, Kessler et al (1981) found that women were more likely than men to seek 
medical help when experiencing similar levels of distress, and that this appeared 
to be related to women’s readiness to conceptualise feelings of distress as a 
recognised emotional problem. Similarly, when presented with vignettes, women 
more readily identified the person described as having depression than men did. 
Interestingly, both men and women were more likely to identify a person as 
having a mental disorder if they were women compared to if they were male, 
even if they demonstrated identical ‘symptoms’ (Swami, 2012). This could 
arguably suggest that the dominant discourses in society more readily 
pathologise the emotional experience of women than men. 
Ussher (2010) has suggested that the mass media has played an important role 
in influencing the way we perceive distress. She draws attention to the push for 
‘mental health literacy’, postulating that this has led to governments actively 
promoting ‘depression literacy’, and thus widely distributing information about 
depression as a construct (Gattuso et al; Ussher, 2010). Ussher (2010) goes on 
to highlight that women’s distress has also been consistently constructed as 
depression in a wide variety of other mass circulation literature (Blum and 
Stracuzzi, 2004), including women’s magazines (Gattuso et al, 2005), health 
policy (Gattuso et al., 2005), self-help books (Gardner, 2003) and drug company 
literature (Metzl and Angel, 2004). 
1.3.1. How Powerful are Messages in the Media? 
 
The role of the mass media has been researched in relation to a whole host of 
social problems including the increase in violence and homicide and racial and 
gender inequality (e.g. Hiebert, 1995; Howitt, 1982). The media has also been of 
specific interest to psychology in a number of domains, with evidence to suggest 
that the media is the public’s primary source of information about psychological 
distress (Kalafetalis & Dowden 1997). One particularly well-researched area is 
that of body image, with a huge evidence base suggesting that unrealistic 
depictions of beauty in the media play a significant role in body dissatisfaction 
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and subsequent problems, especially in girls and women (e.g. Cusumano & 
Thompson, 2000; Grabe, Ward & Hyde, 2008; Hargreaves & Tiggemann, 2003). 
Another area which has received attention is the role of media in creating or 
maintaining stigma around psychological distress and psychiatric diagnosis. For 
example, a study of British television (Rose, 1998) found that the most common 
themes attached to ‘madness’ were danger and violence, and that this was the 
case both for fictional programmes and news stories. In a context where the 
media is a primary source of information about psychological distress and 
psychiatric diagnosis, this is likely to have an impact on those experiencing 
distress (Kalafatelis & Dowden, 1997).  
The evidence therefore suggests that there is a link between media depictions, 
attitudes and behaviours. According to the Foucauldian argument (1965) 
discussed earlier, this is happening due to the planting of particular ideas about 
how distress can be expressed in a way understood by and expected by the 
person’s culture. Davies (2013) draws on two particular case examples which 
support the argument that the media is shaping the way we construct, understand 
and express misery and distress. The first case he describes involves the death 
of a 14 year old school girl in Hong Kong who was found at post-mortem to have 
starved herself to death. At the time this was an extremely rare event in Hong 
Kong and it received intense media attention, eventually leading to ‘anorexia’ 
posited as an explanation. As public knowledge about anorexia nervosa grew, so 
did reported incidences, with such a sharp incline it was considered a local 
epidemic (Davies, 2013). In an attempt to make sense of the event, Watters 
(2010) examined the available evidence. Many argued that Western depictions of 
beauty or pop culture were to blame, however, Watters (2010) found that what 
had happened mirrored what also happened in America and Europe once the 
‘disease’ was named. He suggested that once the label and understanding was 
introduced, it provided an unconscious behaviour through which young women 
could draw on to communicate their distress (Watters, 2010).  
The second case that Davies (2013) draws on is that of deliberate self-harm in 
Britain in the late 1980s. He reports that during this time increasing numbers of 
young women were presenting to mental health services with self-inflicted 
wounds, and the numbers continued to rise dramatically into the 1990s and 
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2000s. The dramatic trend could not be explained by a general decline in child 
well-being, which, whilst not ideal, had not decreased during that period (Davies, 
2013; Save the Children, 2004). In an examination of references to self-harm in 
the media between 1966 and 2005, Whitlock et al, (2009) found only 2 films with 
unambiguous self-harm references prior to 1980, compared with over 50 songs 
and 20 films between 2000 and 2005. A similar trend was found in printed news 
articles. Between 1966 and 1990 253 stories were found that referenced 
deliberate self-harm, compared with 1,750 found between 2000 and 2005. Davies 
(2013) uses these examples to make a convincing argument about the role of 
media in influencing the way in which we make sense of and express our 
distress.  
The power of the media is important in the medicalization of women’s distress, as 
evidence suggests that ‘normal’ female experiences are being increasingly 
positioned as pathological. In an examination of advertisements for anti-
depressant medication between 1985 and 2000, Metzl and Angel (2004) noted a 
clear shift towards positioning normal reactions to life events experienced by 
women (marriage, motherhood, menstruation and menopause) as depression, 
thus warranting medical intervention. In contrast, depression in men was 
positioned as a biochemical illness, with far less evidence of pathologisation of 
normal reactions to life events. Munce et al (2004) suggest that the 
overrepresentation of women in psychiatric advertising has played a role in the 
over-diagnosis of depression in women. In support of this argument, Malerud and 
Okkes (1998) found that doctors attribute different meanings to identical 
symptoms in male and female patients or attribute female illness to psychiatric 
disorders and prescribe inappropriate psychotropic medication. The insidious 
nature of medicalization of female distress in the media arguably represents 
increasing pathologisation of women (Ussher, 2010).  
This evidence therefore supports the Foucauldian argument that psychiatric 
diagnoses and expressions of distress are cultural creations (Foucault, 1965). 
Importantly, given the inherent link between the way in which we construct reality 
and the way in which we thus respond, this will likely impact heavily on how 
women respond to distress. It could be that women are more likely to seek 
medical help rather than examining the social or political context within which 
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their distress has arisen. In addition this could also explain to some extent why 
women are far more likely to be prescribed anti-depressant medication than men 
(Simon-Wastilla, 2000). 
1.4. Summary and Development of Research Questions 
1.4.1. Summary 
 
Epidemiological research consistently demonstrates that women are over-
represented in all common psychiatric diagnoses. Current mainstream 
explanations for this include biological and social explanations, but few question 
the validity of the diagnoses given or explore the socio-political context. Social 
constructionist approaches argue that psychiatric diagnoses are socially 
constructed phenomena unique to a particular time and culture rather than 
existing biological entities. Both historical and current evidence supports the 
Foucauldian (1965) view that conceptions of madness or distress are created 
within a culture, and once the public become aware of a particular accepted way 
of experiencing and expressing distress, the numbers of those experiencing that 
particular manifestation will increase. Evidence suggests that the media is the 
primary source of information for the public about madness and distress 
(Kalafetalis & Dowden 1997), and it plays a vital role in the way people 
conceptualise and experience distress.  
For the purpose of this research, I am therefore interested in how the media 
constructs women’s distress, and how this may contribute to the over-
representation of women in common mental health problems. Whereas some 
previous research has explored the role of mass media in representing distress 
as psychiatric, most of this has focused primarily on depression, and no research 
appears to have focused on media specifically aimed at those women most over-
represented. For this reason, I want to critically evaluate the discursive strategies 
used to construct ideas about common forms of distress (commonly labelled as 
anxiety and depression) in a magazine specifically targeted at those women who 
are (demographically) most over-represented. That is adult women from lower 
socio-economic backgrounds, and in particular mothers (Bebbington, 1998; 
Kessler et al, 1994; Paykel, 2005). Magazines were chosen for two reasons, 
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firstly, by looking at the readership statistics we are able to ensure that they are 
targeting the groups of women most over-represented. Secondly, the role of print 
media in presenting particular conceptualisations of distress appears to be under-
researched. One study conducted in Sweden carried out a discourse analysis of 
personal accounts of depression in newspapers with a gendered focus (Bengs et 
al, 2008), but these newspapers were not marketed specifically to women and 
the focus was on personal accounts and depression only. In addition Gattuso et 
al (2005) examined discourses of depression in two Australian magazines. Whilst 
this research revealed interesting information about the construction of 
depression in these sources of media, they were targeted at middle class 
audiences who are not the most over-represented groups, and the focus was 
specifically on depression. 
1.4.2. Relevance to Clinical Psychology 
 
As highlighted above, particular assumptions and concepts allow particular 
actions. As argued previously, by implicitly colluding with a biomedical framework 
and psychiatric diagnosis, Clinical Psychology serves to maintain individualistic 
and de-contextualised accounts of distress. Smail (2011; Hagan & Smail, 1997a) 
has consistently argued that a materialist understanding of power is central to 
understanding psychological distress, and that without addressing real 
inequalities in power we can do very little to reduce distress (Hagan & Smail, 
1997a; Smail, 2011). 
These ideas raise a number of concerns and questions related to the practice of 
Clinical Psychology. For example, by treating distress in an individual, are we 
inadvertently maintaining social inequalities by placing the problem within the 
person? Where does our role begin and end in addressing social inequalities or 
challenging unhelpful constructions of distress? Who are we serving to empower 
in our work, the profession of Clinical Psychology or the people we are working 
with?  
An alternative to working according to traditional, diagnostically-organised mental 
health services is Community Psychology. Community Psychology approaches 
locate distress within multiple contexts, both at the micro-level, such as family 
and peer group, and at the macro-level, such as socio-political and community 
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contexts (Orford, 2008). As a result, Community Psychology thus aims to support 
people to find real ways of overcoming inequalities and becoming empowered 
(Orford, 2008). This approach therefore has a very different conceptual 
framework which permits very different responses, which may arguably be of 
favour to disadvantaged groups. 
1.4.3. Research Aims 
 
The aims of the current study are: 
-To critically analyse the way mental health and psychological distress are 
constructed in a widely read magazine targeted at women, with a particular focus 
on anxiety, depression and somatoform disorders as these are the areas in which 
the greatest gender divide exists. There will be a specific focus on a magazine 
targeted at women who are (demographically) most overrepresented in these 
diagnostic categories.  
-To discuss the potential impact this may have on women’s understanding of their 
own mental health and psychological distress. 
-To reflect on how this might impact on clinical practice. 
2. EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY 
I will begin this section by discussing the epistemological stance taken in this 
research study, and will then go on to discuss the methodology used. I will then 
explain and justify the data selected for investigation, including the type of data 
chosen, the sample size and the data collection. Finally I will discuss my data 
analysis. 
2.1. Epistemology 
2.1.1. Critique of Realism 
 
As discussed in the previous section of this thesis, the vast majority of research 
into psychiatric disorders and the gender gap in diagnosis takes a realist 
epistemological position (Ussher, 2010). Realism assumes that there is a 
straightforward relationship between the world (‘reality’), and our perception and 
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understanding of it (Burr, 2003; Willig, 2013). The most common position within 
this framework used in psychological research is ‘hypothetico-deductivism’ 
(Willig, 2013). Hypothetico-deductivism originated from Karl Popper, due to his 
idea that we can never prove with certainty that one thing (A) causes another (B), 
because no matter how many times we observe it, there is always the possibility 
that the next time will be an exception to the rule. Popper argued that the only 
way to have certainty is to falsify a theory rather than verify it. By doing this, he 
suggested, we can find out what claims are false and thus by a process of 
elimination we can progress towards ‘truth’ (Willig, 2013). 
This approach has been extensively challenged and critiqued. As discussed in 
the previous section, realism cannot adequately account for the way in which 
concepts and understandings vary between time and culture (Burr, 2003; Ussher, 
2010). In addition, Willig (2013) outlines a number of other problems associated 
with using the hypothetico-deductivism method for psychological research. These 
include the over-reliance on existing theories rather than generating innovative 
ones, the elitist nature of this approach which alienates people who are not 
familiar with current theories or practice and the unrealistic nature of hypothetico-
deductivism. As highlighted by Willig (2013), Kuhn (1962) argued that in reality, a 
theory is not necessarily rejected when falsified, and instead researchers often 
hypothesise that the methodology, design or execution of the research project 
are to blame for the finding (Willig, 2013). 
2.1.2. Social Constructionism 
 
The epistemological position adopted in this study is one of social 
constructionism. As discussed in the previous section of this thesis, social 
constructionism, in contrast to realism, denies that our knowledge about the world 
results from a direct perception of reality (Burr, 2003). Rather, social 
constructionism argues that human experience is mediated historically, culturally 
and linguistically (Willig, 2013). We are thus cautioned to be critical towards 
taken-for-granted knowledge about the world rather than assuming knowledge is 
universal and objective (Burr, 2003). 
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2.1.3. Relativism vs Realism 
 
Social constructionism can be seen as an ‘umbrella term’, under which multiple 
positions can be held, but all of which share the assumptions outlined above 
(Burr, 2003). One important distinction between different social constructionist 
approaches is the position taken on ‘reality’. Whilst social constructionist 
approaches necessarily reject the idea that we can directly observe reality, a 
continuum exists between a critical realist position and a relativist position (Burr, 
2003; Nightingale & Cromby, 1999). Relativism dictates that the only things we 
have access to are our various representations of the world, and we cannot 
therefore make any reference to reality or the ‘truth’. In other words, there is no 
understanding available beyond a text (Burr, 2003; Edwards & Potter, 1992). In 
contrast, critical realist approaches maintain that whilst language (mediated by 
cultural, historical and political context) constructs the way we understand the 
world, some concept of reality does exist outside of discourse and texts (Burr, 
2003; Nightingale & Cromby, 1999). This approach has been taken by many due 
to a critique of relativist approaches which can negate the reality of issues such 
as misery and distress, oppression and social inequality (Burr, 2003; Hepburn, 
2003; Ussher, 2010).  
For the purposes of this research I will hold a social constructionist critical realist 
position. Given that I am interested both in the way in which female distress is 
being constructed and the social and clinical implications of this, it is imperative 
that the ‘real’ of female misery and gender inequality is adequately 
acknowledged. Taking a relative position would imply that all accounts of the 
world are equally valid, thus making a political stance difficult to justify and uphold 
(Burr, 2003; Hepburn, 2003).  
2.1.4. Macro Social Constructionism vs Micro Social Constructionism 
 
Another distinction made within social constructionist approaches is that of 
‘macro’ social constructionism and ‘micro’ social constructionism (Burr, 2003). 
Micro social constructionism suggests that social constructionism takes place 
within everyday discourse between people in interaction. It is interested in how 
people use language to negotiate an interaction and with what purpose. Within 
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this framework, multiple versions of the world are potentially available and none 
is truer than any other (Burr, 2003).  
Macro social constructionism acknowledges the constructive power of language 
but sees this as related to material or social structures, and the impact of power 
is seen as central to this form of social constructionism (Burr, 2003). Importantly, 
these two types of approaches are not mutually exclusive (Burr, 2003), and for 
the purpose of this research study I will endeavour to examine both. The way in 
which I intend to do this is discussed below. 
2.2. Methodology 
2.2.1. Discourse Analysis: Discursive Psychology vs Deconstructionism 
 
Discourse analysis refers to the study of language in the construction of social 
reality (Willig, 2013). However, there are broadly speaking two main versions of 
discourse analysis, one of which primarily focuses at the level of ‘micro’ social 
constructionism (discursive psychology), and the other at the level of ‘macro’ 
social constructionism (Foucauldian discourse analysis, deconstructionism and 
critical discourse analysis) (Burr, 2003; Willig, 2013).  
Discursive approaches to discourse analysis were initially introduced to British 
social psychology by Potter and Wetherell (1987), although the term ‘discursive 
psychology’ was later created by Edwards and Potter (1992) (Willig, 2013). 
Discursive psychology proposes that language is not a direct representation or 
direct communication of psychological phenomena such as attitudes or beliefs. 
Rather, language is used in particular and subtle ways to construct such 
phenomena and to perform particular actions. In this way language can be used 
to construct social interaction and our experience of the world (Potter & 
Wetherall, 1987). Discursive psychologists are therefore interested in how people 
use language in their interactions with each other, and how they use linguistic 
skills to build specific accounts which can have perform functions with powerful 
implications (Burr, 2003). For example, Edwards and Potter (1992) examined 
how factual reports are constructed and how cognitive states are attributed and 
for what purpose. Discursive psychology can therefore be seen to investigate 
how participants use language to negotiate interactions and achieve 
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interpersonal objectives (Willig, 2013). This is relevant to this research as the 
discursive strategies used in the articles are likely to have a significant impact on 
the experience of the reader. For example, a ‘factual’ article written by a 
professional is likely to have different implications than a ‘real life’ story written by 
a reader. 
Whilst I am interested in the discursive strategies used in the magazine articles, I 
am also interested in the way in which discourses adopted are shaped by the 
wider social, cultural and political context, and, furthermore, what discourses 
these contexts allow or inhibit. As outlined above, this refers to macro social 
constructionism. Deconstructionism refers to the analysis of data at the level of 
macro social constructionism, and draws on the work of Foucault and Derrida 
(Burr, 2003). Foucault (1965; 1972; 1976; 1979) argued that the culturally 
sanctioned ideas (or discourses) we hold about people in society (such as the 
‘mentally ill’) are associated with specific implications for how these people may 
be treated. Deconstructionism therefore involves focusing on ‘the historical and 
cultural specificity of knowledge and the possibilities for social action and power’ 
(Burr, 2003). In this way this approach seeks to critique the discursive worlds that 
people inhabit and reflect on the way discourse impacts on subjective experience 
(Willig, 2013). 
2.2.2. Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), like other branches of discourse analysis, 
refers to a range of approaches that assume language represents social action 
(Richardson, 2007). Unlike many other forms of discourse analysis (and in 
particular discursive approaches) CDA takes an explicitly political stance towards 
data analysis (Benwell & Stokoe, 2006; Wodak & Meyer, 2009). Critical 
Discourse Analysts argue that if language contributes to the (re)production of 
social life, then it must also be contributing to and maintaining social inequalities 
(Richardson, 2007). CDA therefore specifically selects a topic for study which is 
considered to be a social problem of some kind (Fairclough, 1995). 
Another key difference between DP and CDA is that CDA is explicitly interested 
in both micro and macro levels of social constructionism. CDA therefore attends 
to the level of textual analysis and discursive strategies used to perform a 
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particular social function (‘micro’ social constructionism), as well as considering 
socio-political functions of discourse and the inherent influence of power 
structures in the formation of particular conceptualisations (‘macro’ social 
constructionism) (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). In this way CDA aims to contribute to 
‘social wrongs’ of the time by analysing sources and causes of social problems or 
inequalities as well as examples of resistance and possibilities for overcoming 
(Fairclough, 2001). 
Rather than representing a particular methodology, CDA represents ‘a critical 
perspective or stance’ within the discipline of discourse studies, potentially 
drawing on a large number of methods from different disciplines (Fairclough, 
2001; van Dijk, 2009). Importantly, whichever methods are selected for analysis 
they will typically include the following properties: the aim to analyse and 
contribute to the solution of serious social problems caused or exacerbated by 
public text and talk, an analysis that allows a critical assessment of abusive 
discursive practices as well as guidelines for intervention or resistance and finally 
the analysis should specifically take into account the interest, expertise and 
resistance of those disempowered by discursive injustice or abuse (van Dijk, 
2009).  
2.2.3. Discursive Psychology and Critical Discourse Analysis: A Hybrid Approach 
 
As highlighted previously, the aim of this research is to both critically analyse the 
way in which distress is constructed in the magazine selected for analysis (the 
‘micro’ level of social constructionism), as well as reflecting on and discussing the 
socio-political functions of the discourse used and the way in which this may 
position women in ways that disadvantage them (the ‘macro’ level of social 
constructionism).  
In order to investigate this, I will adopt a ‘hybrid’ DP and CDA approach as used 
successfully by Winter (2013). I will use the framework for discourse analysis 
described by Willig (2013) to identify ‘how the text constructs its objects and 
subjects, how such constructions vary across discursive contexts, and with what 
consequences they may be deployed’ (Willig, 2013). In particular I am interested 
in identifying the different ways in which psychological distress is constructed 
within the texts. Such constructions are referred to as ‘interpretive repertoires’ by 
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Potter and Wetherell (1987), and different repertoires are deployed in different 
contexts to perform particular social actions (Willig, 2013).  
Alongside this, I have drawn on CDA as a ‘critical perspective’ (van Dijk, 2009) to 
allow me to examine the medicalization and pathologisation of female distress as 
an identified social problem (Ussher, 2010). Subsequently, I have a particular 
interest in psychiatric and psychological constructions of distress. In addition, as 
inherent to CDA, this research will aim to contribute to addressing the ‘social 
wrongs’ of the medicalization and pathologisation of women’s distress by 
analysing the sources and causes of medicalization, and discussing potential 
routes of social action and resistance (Fairclough, 2001). The discursive and 
CDA aspects of my analysis will not reported in separate sections, and rather the 
principles of CDA will be drawn on throughout the discursive analysis.  
2.3. Description of the Sample 
I will be analysing magazine articles about psychological distress and misery 
from the magazine ‘Take a Break’. The magazines will be read for any articles 
containing references to mental health and the relevant articles selected will be 
analysed using a hybrid approach borrowing principles from DP and CDA.  
2.3.1. Justification for the Sample  
 
As discussed in the previous section of this thesis, the literature suggests that 
adult women are overrepresented in common psychiatric diagnoses, including 
depression, anxiety and somatoform disorders (WHO, 2001). In addition, there is 
some evidence to suggest that married and lone mothers are at additional risk of 
being given such a diagnosis (Bebbington 1996; 1998; Belle, 1990; Lipman, 
Offord & Boyle, 1997; Paykel, 1991; Piccinelli & Wilkinson, 2000). Furthermore 
women from a low socioeconomic status are at higher risk of receiving a 
diagnosis of depression (Kessler et al, 1994; Stansfield et al, 2003). 
Following from this research, I selected a magazine for analysis that explicitly 
targeted adult women who are in their ‘reproductive years’ and who are from a 
lower socioeconomic status. On this basis the magazine ‘Take a Break’ was 
identified for analysis. ‘Take a Break’ was selected using statistics taken from the 
latest estimates published by the National Readership Survey (2013). The 
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readership statistics for the top 10 selling women’s weekly magazines were 
examined, and the most popular magazine read primarily by women fitting the 
above demographics was selected.    
According to NRS statistics (National Readership Survey, 2013), 2,030,000 
copies of ‘Take a Break’ were sold between January and December 2013, 
making it the best-selling women’s weekly magazine in the UK. Also, according to 
these estimates, 68% of the estimated readership of ‘Take a Break’ magazine are 
working class and 32% from middle or upper classes. It is estimated that 68% of 
readers are over 35 and 32% between 15 and 35. 
2.4. Data Collection 
Weekly copies of the identified magazine, ‘Take a Break’ were collected over a 
three month period. The magazines were then carefully read for articles that refer 
to psychological or psychiatric distress. As a guide, I primarily searched for 
articles that included explicit references to psychiatric diagnosis, mental 
health/illness and/or psychological or psychiatric treatment. This was appropriate 
for guiding the identification of articles as I was specifically interested in the 
medicalization of distress. However, I did not solely rely on a search for key 
words, as both implicit and explicit references to distress are important (Willig, 
2013). Indeed a text that does not contain a direct reference to acute distress and 
instead uses a euphemism (such as ‘the black dog’, used by Winston Churchill as 
as an analogy to ‘depression’) would tell us a lot about way it is constructed and 
will be performing a particular social action (Willig, 2013).  
To be included in the research, articles were also required to feature distress as a 
key topic in the article. This was included in the inclusion and exclusion criteria 
because, on initial reading of the data, some articles were found to reference 
psychiatric diagnosis or emotional distress briefly, or in relation to an unrelated 
matter, with no discussion about the possible causes or consequences of distress 
or about the experience of distress. For example, in a ‘real life’ style article written 
by a woman who describes her husband having an affair, she includes the 
statement ‘I was diagnosed with postnatal depression and I turned to Martin for 
support. He didn’t let me down.’ This is given in evidence of him being a reliable 
character prior to the affair. Whilst a psychiatric diagnosis is mentioned briefly, 
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there is no further mention or discussion about it in the two-page article. This and 
other similar articles were therefore excluded on the basis that they did not 
provide adequately rich data for the purpose of this analysis. Finally, articles that 
focused on the construction of mental health diagnoses or distress in men and 
children were also excluded, as the research question was specifically interested 
in the construction of distress in women. 
2.4.1. Sample Size 
 
On the basis of the inclusion and exclusion criteria outlined above, 18 relevant 
articles were found and used in the analysis. Discourse analysts do not typically 
need to work with a vast amount of data to produce meaningful analyses, and 
ultimately the amount of data needed is dependent on the research question 
(Willig, 2013). As discussed, for the purposes of the present study I was 
interested in the different ways distress was constructed (in other words, the 
different interpretive repertoires used) through informative articles and personal 
accounts in the selected magazine articles, and in the implications of these 
constructions. On this basis, 18 articles was deemed an adequate sample size to 
provide sufficient opportunity to examine the different interpretive repertoires 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987) used to construct distress or common psychiatric 
disorders. See Table 1 for an overview of the articles selected for analysis, 
including the genre of the article and a column highlighting which extracts in the 
analysis came from which article. If an extract was not taken from a particular 
article, but the article was referred to in the analysis, I have highlighted which 
section this occurred in. 
As highlighted by Jäger and Maier (2009), the number of articles deemed 
adequate for analysis will be influenced by the frequency of relevant articles and 
the breadth of ways in which the discursive objects of interest (in this case, 
distress) are constructed. Therefore, if distress is constructed in a number of 
different ways and within a range of different contexts, and if different 
constructions appear quite infrequently, a greater number would be needed to 
identify the range of interpretive repertoires used (Jäger & Maier, 2009; Willig, 
2013). In the case of this research, constructions of distress occurred in the data 
quite frequently, and an arguably limited number of interpretive repertoires were 
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evident in the texts, with particular constructions and associated rhetorical 
devices recurring often.  
 
Table 1.  
An important point to note in relation to sample size and data analysis, is that the 
nature of my research questions means that I aimed to explore ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
particular interpretive repertoires appear in the data, rather than make claims 
about the representativeness and generalizability of my findings. However, a 
convincing case has been made for the potential power of the media in shaping 
Article Genre Extracts taken from article  
‘I feel so alone’ Agony aunt 1, 10, 19 
‘I was abused by my parents’ Agony aunt 9 
‘Are loan sharks after your 
kids?’ 
News feature 2, 7 
‘She says she slept with my 
hubby’ 
Agony aunt 12, 17, 20 
‘My friend has been cutting 
herself’ 
Agony aunt 5, 6 
‘I struggled to bond’ ‘Real life’ story (referenced in section 
3.1.1.1) 
‘Supermum vs supershattered’ News feature 4 
‘Taken from mummy by a rapist’ ‘Real life’ story 3 
‘I’m too scared to get intimate’ Agony aunt 8 
‘Mum at breaking point’ ‘Real life’ story 11, 24 
‘My life has been taken over’ Agony aunt 13, 16, 18 
‘But she’s starving to death!’ ‘Real life’ story 14 
‘Should I tell my daughters the 
truth?’ 
Agony aunt 15, 22, 25 
‘How to…reduce anxiety’ Self-help 21 
‘How to cope with Seasonal 
Affective Disorder’ 
Self-help (referenced in section 
3.1.3.2) 
‘Monster in the cupboard’ ‘Real life’ story 23 
‘My ex has destroyed me’ Agony aunt  
‘Abuse has destroyed my life’ Agony aunt  
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public understandings and conceptions of distress (Davies, 2013; Grabe, Ward & 
Hyde, 2008; Howitt, 1982; Kalafetalis & Dowden, 1997), and it is important to 
consider the potential implications of different constructions of distress may have 
on readers. In addition, as highlighted by McCarthy and Rapley (2001), often a 
culture can be understood by assuming the culture will show ‘order at all points’, 
an observation initially made by Sacks (1992a). The ‘order at all points’ argument 
suggests that ‘order’ (such as particular social practices or ‘attitudes’) is not only 
present or observable at an aggregate level, but is also present on a ‘case-by-
case’ basis. In order words, according to Sacks (1992a) we can assume that by 
examining ‘fragments of a culture, that which operates across a culture as a 
whole will come clearly into view’ (McCarthy & Rapley, 2001, p. 162). In 
accordance with this view, it is therefore possible that examples of the 
interpretive repertoires identified in this analysis are identifiable in constructions 
of women’s distress in other contexts. 
2.4.2. Using Media Text 
 
The use of magazine articles is appropriate in relation to my research question 
which aims to investigate the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of particular conceptualisations of 
distress in mass media targeted at women. The question of ‘why’ can be located 
from a number of different viewpoints, depending on how the media source and 
audience are conceptualised (Gandy, 2000). For example, if the audience are 
viewed as the public, and the journalistic articles as viewed as objective reports 
of the truth, then the purpose can be seen as consciousness raising (Richardson, 
2007). Alternatively, if the audience is positioned as a consumer, and the 
magazine primarily as a business, the purpose will be to sell stories in the most 
profitable manner possible (Richardson, 2007). 
It is also important to consider the media production processes involved in using 
text taken from magazines. Whilst the magazine under study presents ‘real life’ 
stories and ‘agony-aunt’ style letters written by readers, these articles are in fact 
written in a very particular and uniform journalistic style. Where the letters 
included represent ‘real’ letters written in by readers, they are still likely to have 
undergone a series of processes including editing and formatting to suit the style 
of the magazine. The implications of this is that the text under study is not a 
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naturalistic conversation as would typically be studied using discursive 
psychology (Willig, 2013).   
2.5. Position and Self-Reflexivity 
Qualitative research recognises that the researcher will always come with their 
own values, beliefs and agendas and will thus always shape and influence the 
research process (Willig, 2013), and it is therefore important that I reflect on my 
own position in relation to this research. As discussed previously, CDA is an 
explicitly political approach with a particular social problem under investigation, 
so an objective position is not sought (Burr, 2003). However, it is still of 
importance to reflect on my own position and how this influences the current 
research. 
For the purpose of this research I am interested in the use of power, the 
medicalization of female distress and the subjugation of alternative narratives 
which highlight social and political context. From my position as a critical 
researcher, I position the magazine as a business and the audience as 
consumers (Richardson, 2007). The increase in medicalisation can be 
persuasively argued to be partially related to psychiatry and consumerism 
(Davies, 2013; Moncrieff, 2011), and therefore this position has been deemed 
appropriate for this particular project.  
In addition, as is inherent to a CDA approach, I will be considering the power of 
the magazines and advertisers in creating or manipulating audiences. As 
discussed by Richardson (2007), media producers may attempt to attract a 
particular audience in order to attract relevant advertising revenue, and this is 
often achieved on the basis of attracting people from a particular social class. 
The magazine I intend to analyse is aimed at an audience from “lower” social 
classes, and I will therefore remain critical of the possible functions of 
constructing information in a particular way for this audience. 
On a related note, the magazine I will be analysing may contain advice columns. 
As I am particularly interested in medicalisation, I will be approaching these from 
a critical perspective, and am interested in whether biomedical explanations are 
privileged in favour of other narratives, or whether a range of accounts of 
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explanatory frameworks are presented. I will also be interested in the use of 
professional titles such as ‘doctor’ and how discourses of science are used to 
exert power. 
Finally, this research follows from the work of a number of feminist academics, 
and as a feminist and critical psychologist I have a particular interest in gender 
inequality and the way in which this is maintained.  
2.6. Process 
Below I will summarise the process by which I analysed my data according to the 
principles of Discourse Analysis and CDA. 
1. Having chosen my data source, ‘Take a Break’ magazine, I collected a copy of 
this magazine weekly over a three month period.  
2. The magazines were then carefully read, and each article that met the 
inclusion and exclusion criteria highlighted above were noted. Before beginning 
analysis, selected articles were read and re-read to allow me to experience the 
discursive effects of the text as a reader rather than as a researcher (Willig, 
2013).  
3. Selected articles were then read and re-read with the intention of coding the 
data in light of the research question. During this process all data that had 
potential relevance to the research question was identified and highlighted (Willig, 
2013).  
4. I then began to analyse the data in two phases. The first phase was conducted 
with the aim to find patterns in the data, both with regards to differences in the 
content or form of accounts, and the identification of features shared by accounts 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987). This led to the identification of different ‘interpretive 
repertoires’ used to construct distress (Willig, 2013). 
The second (closely related) phase was to examine the function and 
consequence of different repertoires of distress. This involved forming 
hypotheses about these functions and effects and searching for the linguistic 
evidence in terms of rhetorical devices and stylistic and grammatical features 
(Hepburn, 2003; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). 
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During this analysis and discussions I also drew on CDA as a ‘critical perspective’ 
(van Dijk, 2009), allowing me to reflect on the social implications of interpretive 
repertoires, including the way in which particular constructions may serve to 
disempower women and legitimize power abuses (van Dijk, 2009).   
5. The analyses were then reported by presenting the interpretive repertoires 
identified from the data, with a discussion of how and why these particular 
interpretive repertoires were constructed. A critical perspective consistent with 
CDA was drawn on throughout, but issues related to power and social inequality 
were explicitly reflected on in the discussion section. 
2.7. Ethical Considerations 
The data used in this study is publicly available information. I am not using any 
participants, so ethical considerations related to consent, anonymity, 
confidentiality, deception and right to withdraw will not apply. This research 
project has been registered with and ethically approved by The University of East 
London. 
3. ANALYSIS 
3.1. The Data Sample 
As highlighted in the methodology section, 18 articles were selected for analysis 
on the basis of meeting the inclusion and exclusion criteria. These articles 
consisted of five ‘real-life stories’, two ‘self-help’ articles, two ‘news report’ 
articles, and nine ‘agony-aunt’ style articles. The articles were analysed using the 
steps outlined in the methodology section. Three overarching interpretive 
repertoires were identified. These were: ‘Distress as a Normative Reaction’, 
‘Distress as a Biomedical Condition’ and ‘Distress as a Matter of Personal 
Responsibility’. Each repertoire consisted of a set of particular assumptions and 
employed a range of rhetorical devices to position the construction as valid and 
convincing. The analysis will be presented in the format of the following 
subsections: 
Distress as a normative reaction 
- Psycho-social ‘cause’ of distress 
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- Corroboration and consensus: a universal response 
o Corroboration from an expert: reporter of truth 
o Corroboration of personal stories: it happened to me too 
- Hardship, trauma and the need for support 
Distress as a biomedical condition 
- Biomedical discourse: reification of diagnosis 
- Mentally ill: irrational and out of control 
- Acceptance and the need for medical management 
Distress as a matter of personal responsibility 
- Personal responsibility to control distress 
- Responsibility to keep quiet: secrecy, shame and protecting others 
 
It has been recommended by some that when reporting discourse analytic 
research, it can be preferable to merge analysis and discussion sections (Willig, 
2013). This is because a meaningful analysis of this kind can only really take 
place within the context of a discussion about the insights generated by the 
analysis (Willig, 2013). For this purpose, initial discussions will be included 
throughout this analysis section. Whilst CDA will be drawn on throughout the 
analysis, I will use the discussion section of this thesis to explicitly reflect on the 
way in which language contributes to social inequalities experienced by women in 
a mental health context. 
 
3.1.1. Distress as a ‘Normative’ Reaction to Context 
 
This interpretive repertoire is used in ten of the articles. This repertoire refers to 
the construction of distress as a ‘normal’ and ‘understandable’ reaction to 
situations that are highly stressful or traumatic. This construction occurs within 
two key contexts, the context of motherhood and the burden associated with a 
caring role, and in the context of victimisation in a variety of contexts including 
childhood abuse, sexual abuse and bullying. The articles within this repertoire all 
follow a similar structure, in that they include a cited ‘cause’ of distress, 
corroboration from others that the distress is a ‘normal’ and common response, 
and recommendation for intervention, generally positioned within a framework of 
support but advocating for help from a ‘professional’. A number of discursive 
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strategies are used to construct this repertoire, and I will discuss these using 
example extracts from the data below.  
 
3.1.1.1. Psycho-Social ‘Cause’ of Distress 
 
As highlighted above, articles that construct distress as a normative reaction 
either explicitly or implicitly posit a psycho-social ‘cause’ of the individual’s 
distress. By far the majority of articles within this repertoire cited victimisation or 
stress associated with motherhood as the ‘cause’, with ten articles referencing 
victimisation and five referencing the burden of care. Below is an example of an 
explicitly identified ‘cause’ of distress: 
 
Extract: 1 
 
5  I’m a disabled single mum with two sons. A year ago I lost my  
6  dad to cancer and six months later my mum had a massive  
7  stroke.  
8  This has left me severely depressed. 
 
In this extract the author has explicitly named a number of psycho-social ‘causes’ 
for her depression, and the causal link has been expressed with certainty using 
the statement ‘This has left me severely depressed’. ‘Causes’ include her 
mother’s illness and the loss of her father, and the inclusion and positioning of the 
statement ‘I’m a disabled single mum with two sons’, invites the reader to 
construct this as also being of relevance to the author’s experience of 
depression. This concept is supported by evidence in the literature, which 
suggests that lone mothers are more likely to suffer from poor physical and 
mental health outcomes than mothers in relationships (Belle, 1990; Lipman, 
Offord & Boyle, 1997). In addition, assumptions about lone mothers, 
disadvantage and poverty are also represented more widely in political and 
professional discourses in society (Fineman, 1991). The construction of the 
extract and the availability of these discourses arguably invite the reader to 
construct the author’s distress as ‘understandable’.  
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Such references to the ‘strain’ of caring and of motherhood are not unique to this 
article, with the article ‘Mum at breaking point’ citing caring for a disabled child as 
the cause of ‘severe clinical depression’, and the article ‘my friend has been 
cutting herself’ referencing lone motherhood as a key source of distress. In 
addition, two articles focus on the strains of being a new mother, citing this as 
relevant to ‘maternal suicide’ and ‘post-natal depression’ (‘Supermum vs 
Supershattered’ and ‘I struggled to bond’). 
 
Bereavement and loss, also referenced in the extract, also arguably represent 
‘understandable’ sources of distress. Whilst there is a preoccupation in modern 
UK society to study and conceptualise ‘healthy’ and ‘pathological’ responses to 
bereavement, there is also a widely held view that loss of a loved one is 
associated with emotional pain and grief (Valentine, 2008).  
 
Another example of an identified psycho-social cause is that posited in the article 
‘Are loan sharks targeting your kids?’ In this article distress as suggested to be 
an understandable result of victimisation by loan sharks: 
 
Extract: 2 
 
94  Tony Quigley says: “I know of a case where the loan shark sat  
95  outside the person’s property for hours.” 
96  “It’s like water torture and sometimes it boils over to the point where  
97  victims feel so depressed they feel they don’t have the ability to  
98  continue living any longer.” 
99  In fact, Tony believes that his team have prevented around 25  
100  suicides. 
 
In this extract, harassment and victimisation by loan sharks is described using 
‘water torture’ as a metaphor. Wood and Kroger (2000) argue that metaphor can 
be used discursively to perform a range of functions, including ‘hedging’ or 
weakening claims or justifying an argument. In this example, the metaphor 
appears to be employed as a rhetorical device to communicate the extreme 
nature of harassment. In turn, this constructs subsequent distress as normal and 
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expected given the extremity of the context. The construction of the extreme 
nature of distress in this way may also serve to justify the later claim that ‘his 
team have prevented around 25 suicides’, which would arguably be difficult to 
evidence and open to challenge.  
 
Another example in which victimisation is constructed as the ‘cause’ of distress is 
included below. This extract is taken from the article ‘Taken from Mummy by a 
rapist’. 
 
Extract: 3 
 
106  I had to watch as Mum did everything for my little boy and I ached  
107  inside. Billy was the only person I really loved and it felt as though 
108  she had stolen him from me.  
109  Soon after, John raped me again and I fell into a black hole of  
110  depression. 
 
This article is written by an author as a ‘real life story’. In it, the author describes 
becoming pregnant as a teenager after being raped by her stepfather, but feeling 
unable to tell her mother. The baby is then brought up by the author’s parents. In 
this particular extract, attribution for the author’s ‘depression’ is implicitly made to 
two key ‘causes’: loss of the mother role and sexual abuse. Once again, these 
represent ‘understandable’ causes of depression or distress, consistent with 
dominant discourses in UK society. 
 
Firstly, the dominant discourse in UK society about motherhood is 
sentimentalised, with mothers constructed as being self-sacrificing, consumed 
with love and ever available for and dedicated to her child (Bassin, Honey & 
Kaplan, 1994; Hays, 1996). Within this conceptual framework, it is therefore 
‘understandable’ that the loss of the author’s child would lead to significant 
distress. A number of rhetorical devices are used to construct the extent of the 
distress in relation to separation from the infant. Firstly, an attribution of blame 
and responsibility is inherent in the description ‘I had to watch as Mum did 
everything’. The use of the phrase ‘had to’ positions the author’s lack of maternal 
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role as both against her wishes and out of her control, externalizing responsibility 
from the author and instead attributing blame to her mother and stepfather. 
Edwards and Potter (1992) suggest that ‘actions in descriptions’ are a common 
feature of discourse, frequently used to attribute blame or responsibility.  
 
In this extract, the use of an emotional metaphor is also deployed, in the 
description ‘I ached inside’. Edwards (1999) suggests that emotion metaphors 
are conceptual resources used to perform particular rhetorical functions. In this 
particular example, the author is equating her emotional experience with physical 
pain, perhaps in order to emphasise the ‘realness’ or ‘tangibility’ of the 
experience, or to emphasise the extremity of distress.  
 
Another rhetorical device in use in lines 106-107 is the use of extreme case 
formulation. Pomerantz (1986) identified extreme case formulations, identifying 
them as using extreme terms such as ‘always’, ‘never’ or ‘brand new’. Extreme 
case formulations can perform a number of functions, including defending against 
accusations or justifications, to construct something as objective or ‘fact’, or to 
propose that a particular behaviour is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in accordance with the 
frequency in which it occurs (Pomerantz, 1986). In this extract the use of 
‘everything’ is used to construct the powerlessness of the author. The term ‘only’ 
in line 107 is also used to highlight the value and priority of the baby and 
subsequently construct the level of distress as severe. 
 
In addition to the loss of her child, the author also constructs rape as a ‘cause’ of 
depression. Whilst a causal link is not made explicit, the inclusion of the 
statement ‘John raped me again’, and the positioning of it as preceding ‘and I fell 
into a black hole of depression’ invites the reader to construct this as relevant to 
the subsequent distress. As documented in the introductory section of this thesis, 
this is consistent with empirical findings that rape and sexual violence are linked 
with a wide variety of psychiatric diagnoses (including depression, anxiety, 
substance abuse, dissociative disorders and post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) (Pico-Alfonso et al, 2006; Roberts et al, 1998). Arguably, this also reflects 
Anglo-American institutional discourses on rape, which position those who have 
experienced rape as ‘victims’ who are ‘traumatised’ (Hengehold, 2000). The 
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author is therefore drawing on a commonly accepted ‘cause’ of female distress. 
Whilst the link between sexual violence and distress is implicitly understandable 
and arguably symptomatic of sex inequality, some critics have argued that the 
pervasiveness of ‘victim’ discourses in society serve to position women as 
passive and weak (Kitzinger & Thomas 1995). 
 
3.1.1.2. Corroboration and Consensus: A Universal Response 
 
Another way in which distress is constructed as ‘normal’ within this interpretive 
repertoire is through constructing distress as universal or corroborated by others. 
According to Edwards and Potter (1992), corroboration and consensus are 
rhetorical devices used to strengthen a particular argument or make a 
construction more convincing, based on the logic that a greater number of people 
are less likely to be wrong. In the identified articles, corroboration and consensus 
were used within two different contexts, one being corroboration by an ‘expert’, 
and the other being corroboration by somebody with personal, lived experience. 
These will both be discussed using examples below. 
 
3.1.1.2.1. Corroboration from an Expert: Reporter of Truth 
 
The excerpt in the previous section, taken from ‘Are loan sharks targeting your 
kids?’ (Extract 2) demonstrates the use of corroboration by an expert to 
strengthen the argument that distress is a normal response to victimisation by 
loan sharks. The quote provided in lines 94-98 is reported to be by ‘Tony Quigley, 
head of the Illegal Money Lending Team in England’ (line 38). The use of this 
quote is therefore an example of category entitlement, where the point made is 
constructed as coming from an ‘expert’ and thus a credible source (Potter, 1996). 
In lines 99-100, a claim is made that the team have ‘prevented around 25 
suicides’. This use of a concrete figure is a rhetorical device which situates the 
claim within a discourse of ‘fact provision’. 
 
Another example is that used in the article ‘Supermum vs Supershattered’: 
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Extract: 4 
 
27  Caroline Flint, midwife and author of Do Birth – A Gentle Guide to  
28  Labour and Childbirth says that not only are we not caring for new  
29  mums enough, we are failing them.  
30  She says: ‘The biggest cause of maternal death in the UK is suicide 
31  –  and that says to me we are really not treating women correctly  
32  after they’ve given birth. 
 
This is another example of corroboration (Edwards & Potter, 1992) given added 
weight through the ‘expert’ position of the individual corroborating the claims 
made in the article. In this article an argument is made that ‘instead of having 
time to recover, [new mums] are thrown into a world where they feel pressured to 
do housework, juggle the care of their baby with that of other kids, do the 
shopping and host guests.’ The argument that this commonly results in distress is 
therefore strengthened by the use of category entitlement (Potter, 1996), allowing 
this message to be delivered from a source deemed credible to the reader on the 
basis of their profession as a midwife and arguably also their status as a 
published author. The quotation of a statistic also serves to demonstrate 
consensus, as the problem is experienced by many others (Edwards & Potter, 
1992). In addition, the use of statistics is also an example of empiricist 
warranting. Empiricist warranting is described by Edwards and Potter (1992) as 
the presentation of information as if it is a straight-forward presentation of facts in 
the absence of any interpretive work by the reporter.  
 
3.1.1.2.2. Corroboration of Personal Stories: It happened to me too 
 
Another way in which corroboration (Edwards & Potter, 1992) is routinely used 
within the interpretive repertoire of distress as a normative response, is through 
the reporting of ‘personal stories’. For example, in the article ‘My friend has been 
cutting herself’, an ‘agony-aunt’ style is used in which an author writes in with a 
problem, and the article is responded to by somebody with personal experience 
and understanding of the problem. This is a regular feature of the magazine. In 
this particular article, the original author reports: 
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Extract: 5 
 
5  My best friend has a stressful life – her ex-partner was abusive and  
6  she’s now a single mum with two young children. 
7  She struggles and has been self-harming for many years. 
 
To which the respondent replies: 
 
Extract: 6 
 
12  TaB Buddy Dee, 32: ‘I began self-harming in my late teens. There 
13  was a lot going on in my life and I was full of emotions I couldn’t  
14  express.  
15  Cutting myself allowed me to let go of the anger, frustration and  
16  fear. 
 
The respondent’s identification with the reported problem of self-harm as 
attributable to psycho-social circumstances serves to corroborate the original 
hypothesis. In addition, because the author is reportedly speaking from the 
position of their own experience, this arguably qualifies the statement in a similar 
way to category entitlement by ‘experts’ (Gee, 2011). 
 
This is a common feature in all six of the ‘agony-aunt’ style articles within this 
interpretive repertoire. This form of ‘corroboration’ (Edwards & Potter, 1992) is 
also used in addition to category entitlement in the articles referenced above. In 
the article ‘Are loan sharks targeting your kids?’ the article describes the 
victimisation of a woman: 
 
Extract: 7 
 
134  Too frightened to call the police, Jayne continued to pay all she  
135  could. 
136  She says: “I felt like I had nowhere to turn.” 
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137  Finally, she fell into such a deep depression that she had to be  
138  admitted to hospital. 
 
The use of corroboration by both an expert and an individual who has personal 
experience arguably constructs the argument as particularly powerful. Also of 
interest in this excerpt is the way in which Jayne’s distress is constructed. Jayne 
is described as having ‘fell into’ a depression, and she subsequently ‘had to be 
admitted to hospital’. This constructs Jayne as passive to her experience of 
distress and the subsequent treatment she received. Again this could be seen as 
another rhetorical device to construct the ‘normality’ of depression, as it could 
arguably indicate that anyone could be powerless to depression given the 
extreme stress of the situation.    
 
3.1.1.3. Hardship, Trauma and the Need for Support 
 
Another key feature of the interpretive repertoire of ‘distress as a normative 
reaction’ is the way in which responses to distress are constructed. Throughout 
these articles women are positioned as needing ‘support’ or ‘treatment’, including 
social support, counselling or talking therapy and medical support. Below is an 
excerpt from the article ‘I’m too scared to get intimate’: 
 
Extract: 8 
 
20   ‘We took things at my pace and I had more counselling. This might  
21   help you too, as the trance-like feeling you describe – known as   
22   dissociation – is a symptom of post-traumatic stress. 
 
In this excerpt a woman is responding to an ‘agony-aunt’ style letter from another 
woman who is experiencing distress in relation to sex with her partner which she 
attributes to a historical experience of sexual assault. The respondent is sharing 
a similar experience, and making recommendations based on her own 
experience of ‘recovery’.  In particular, the respondent is advising the original 
author to seek ‘counselling’.  
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A number of rhetorical devices are used to construct this as a convincing 
argument. Firstly, as mentioned in the previous section, by constructing the 
argument as speaking from one’s own experience, it is arguably made more 
persuasive (Gee, 2011). In addition, the author draws on biomedical discourse by 
constructing the experience described by the original author within a psychiatric 
framework. This is achieved both by the use of a diagnostic label: ‘post-traumatic 
stress’, and through the use of the term ‘symptom’, conjuring associations of 
medical illness. This biomedical terminology is also an example of empiricist 
warranting (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996), as scientific discourse is 
drawn on to make the recommendations appear reliable and factual. The 
inclusion of the phrase ‘known as dissociation’, is an example of consensus used 
to construct the ‘symptom’ of dissociation as a universally accepted truth rather 
than an argument made solely by the author of the text (Edwards & Potter, 1992).  
 
In critique of the construct used in this article, it has been argued by many that 
the use of the term ‘trauma’ and a biomedical framework serves to individualise 
distress, removing the focus from perpetrators and abusers and placing it instead 
onto victims (Johnstone, 2011). This is echoed in the suggestion that the author 
in this article seek ‘counselling’. In this way, she is seen as the key focus of 
intervention, with no discussion about seeking social justice or addressing the 
social inequalities that permit abuses to take place (Johnstone, 2011).   
 
The following extract is from a letter in an ‘agony-aunt’ style article called ‘I was 
abused by my parents’. It is written in response to an author who wrote in 
describing the emotional impact of childhood abuse. 
 
Extract: 9 
 
26  I strongly advise you to seek professional help. If you try to keep the  
27  past inside you, it will come out in other ways, such as physical  
28  illness or depression. 
 
In this extract the respondent advocates that the original author seeks 
‘professional help’. This is constructed as important and urgent through the use of 
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the term ‘strongly’, and this is further legitimized by the author’s position as 
someone who has personal experience of abuse and who sought support from a 
‘therapist’. The original author is then warned that if they do not seek help they 
may experience ‘physical illness or depression’. This constructs professional help 
as necessary, and subsequent suffering as inevitable if help is not sought. 
Furthermore, depression and physical illness are also constructed here as 
legitimate expressions of distress, contributing to the idea that depression 
represents an ‘understandable’ form of distress, but still one which requires 
‘professional’ management. 
 
In the article ‘I feel so alone’, a variety of recommendations are made to the 
original author by the respondent: 
 
Extract: 10 
 
16  ‘Start by going to see your GP. Explain your situation and ask for  
17  counselling to help with the grief you’re feeling over your dad’s  
18  death and your mum’s illness.  
19  ‘Your doctor may suggest medication or even acupuncture which  
20  I have found relaxing and helpful.  
21  ‘Ask about the Complex Needs Team in your area – you can  
22  refer yourself or be referred via your doctor. They will give you  
23  strategies to deal with the issues you find most challenging.  
24  ‘Next, deal with the practicalities of your daily life. If you need  
25  some time out, see a social worker and ask for respite to help  
26  with your kids. The charities Mind (mind.org.uk) or Home-Start  
27  (home-start.org.uk) can offer support. 
 
In this extract the respondent makes a number of recommendations, including 
sourcing support from the ‘GP’, the ‘Complex Needs Team’ a ‘social worker’ and 
charitable organisations. Importantly, these recommendations include biological, 
psychological and social interventions. Whilst a number of suggestions are made, 
the primary recommendation is to visit the GP and ask for counselling. This is 
clearly prioritised by the instruction ‘Start by’, marking out this action as the first 
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action to be taken. It could be argued that, in a similar fashion to the previous 
extract, by constructing medical and psychological intervention as the most 
urgent or important intervention, distress is being ‘individualised’ (Johnstone, 
2011), with interventions related to the social context presented as secondary or 
‘adjunct’.  
 
Whilst prioritising the medical and psychological interventions can be seen to 
individualise distress, the presence of other psycho-social interventions does 
indicate, at least to some extent, that the social context is also of importance. 
Another example of this is present in the article ‘Mum at breaking point’: 
 
Extract: 11 
 
75  I was prescribed anti-depressants that lifted my mood, but they  
76  couldn’t help me with the day-to-day struggle. 
 
In this extract the author highlights the fact that medication cannot help ‘with the 
day-to-day struggle’. This appears to challenge the dominant discourses in the 
majority of texts which reference psychiatric management positively (see 
‘biomedical’ repertoire below), and acknowledge the ‘real’ of distress related to 
the caring role. 
 
3.1.1.4. Distress as a ‘Normative’ Reaction to Context: Initial Summary and 
Reflections 
 
In the interpretive repertoire ‘distress as a normative reaction’, a narrow range of 
distressing life experiences are either explicitly or implicitly highlighted as causing 
subsequent distress. The particular experiences highlighted were consistent with 
the evidence base and dominant discourses in society about women and trauma, 
given attention has been paid to the burden on managing multiple social roles 
and women are overwhelming more likely than men to be victims of interpersonal 
and sexual violence (Astbury, 2001). 
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Interestingly, although distress was conceptualised as ‘normal’ and 
‘understandable’, in many cases it was simultaneously constructed within a 
psychiatric framework, with women being consistently encouraged to seek help 
from a ‘professional’. This arguably individualised and medicalized women’s 
distress by placing the problem and site of intervention within them, rendering 
them passive in the process. The implications of this will be considered further in 
the discussion section. 
 
3.1.2. Distress as a Biomedical Condition 
 
In the extracts above, there are already examples of the construction of distress 
in psychiatric terms. However, there appeared to be a distinct ‘biomedical’ 
interpretive repertoire in the data, in which distress was constructed within a 
strictly medicalized and traditionally psychiatric framework. A number of 
discursive strategies were used to construct distress in this way, including the 
use of biomedical terminology such as ‘symptoms’, formal ‘diagnoses’ and 
‘medication’, and the reification of diagnoses. Unlike the previous section, within 
this interpretive repertoire there was little or no discussion of interpersonal factors 
or social context as having any relevance to the distress. Another characteristic 
of this interpretive repertoire was that actors experiencing a ‘biomedical condition’ 
were positioned as irrational, out of control and at times a danger to themselves 
or others. These constructions will be discussed below using example extracts 
from the data.  
 
3.1.2.1. Biomedical Discourse: Reification of Diagnosis 
 
The excerpt below is taken from the article ‘She says she slept with my hubby’. In 
this ‘agony-aunt’ style article, an author writes that her best friend recently ‘slept 
with’ the author’s husband. A respondent replies with the following: 
 
Extract: 12 
 
13  TaB Buddy Natalie: ‘As a bipolar sufferer and betrayed wife myself, 
14  I hope I can be of some help to you. Bipolar disorder causes  
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15  massive mood swings – in my “up” moments, I feel as if I could  
16  conquer the world, but when I’m “down”, life looks utterly bleak. 
 
Here the diagnostic label ‘bipolar disorder’ is reified. Reification is a rhetorical 
device used to construct an abstract concept as a material thing (Potter, 1996). In 
this instance, reification allows the author to make the statement ‘Bipolar disorder 
causes…’ without question about the validity of the concept. In addition, this 
claim is made with total certainty as opposed to a more tentative claim such as 
‘bipolar disorder can cause…’ This can be seen to contribute to the reification of 
the concept, constructing the claim as fact. The description of the effects of 
bipolar disorder – ‘massive mood swings’ – also reflects a framework of 
‘symptomology’, consistent with psychiatric discourse. The implicit claims made 
about the validity of bipolar disorder are then corroborated (Edwards & Potter, 
1992) by the author’s own reported experience of ‘mood swings’, validating the 
construction of bipolar disorder as ‘real’.  
 
A second example of the use of a biomedical framework is included below, taken 
from the article ‘My life has been taken over’. 
 
Extract: 13 
 
5  Ever since I was a little girl I’ve had funny habits and behaviours,  
6  and last year I was finally diagnosed with obsessive compulsive  
7  disorder (OCD). 
8  I’m glad I have a diagnosis but I’m still struggling to manage my  
9  condition 
 
In this excerpt the author informs the reader that since she was young she has 
had ‘funny habits and behaviours’, and that last year she was ‘finally diagnosed 
with obsessive compulsive disorder’. The inclusion of information about ‘funny 
habits’, and the use of the word ‘finally’ implies that the author had been 
experiencing OCD for most of her life despite being undiagnosed. As in the 
previous example, this serves to reify (Potter, 1996) OCD as a real ‘thing’ that 
‘exists’. In addition, the life-long aspect of OCD described in this excerpt arguably 
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fits within a biomedical framework in which OCD could be seen to relate to 
genetics or brain biochemistry, as no clear social or contextual factors are 
discussed in the aetiology of the problem. 
 
In lines 8-9 the author goes on to write that they are ‘glad’ to have a diagnosis but 
struggle to ‘manage’ their ‘condition’. This clearly reflects language used to 
construct physical illness, where receiving a diagnosis is considered useful 
because it provides a framework for understanding the experience and it helps 
‘professionals’ to direct ‘treatment’ (Walker, 2006). The use of the word ‘condition’ 
also reflects the language used to construct physical illness. Walker (2006) 
argues that the use of this construction likens psychiatric diagnosis to that of a 
condition such as diabetes, which requires management for the rest of the 
individual’s life by the use of medication or other professional intervention. Walker 
(2006) goes on to argue that this framework thus legitimizes professional 
intervention by constructing a psychiatric condition as something the person 
“has”. In other words, it reifies (Potter, 1996) the label.   
 
The following extract is taken from the ‘real life story’ style article ‘But she’s 
starving to death!’ In this article a woman writes a story about her daughter being 
diagnosed with anorexia. 
 
Extract: 14 
 
53  Picking at her rice. Doing dance classes. Calorie counting. Hiding 
54  food. 
55  Suddenly the penny dropped and I was filled with a sense of dread. 
56  As a child I’d suffered from anorexia. I’d done all the things that  
57  Jade was now doing and I realised she was suffering from the same 
58  illness 
 
In this extract several rhetorical devices are used to construct anorexia as 
biomedical and reify the diagnostic label. Firstly, the extract draws on a script 
formulation (Edwards, 1994), in which the listed behaviours in lines 53-54 are 
constructed as directly attributable to ‘anorexia’. The diagnosis itself is also reified 
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(Potter, 1996) in a number of ways. Firstly, the use of the phrase ‘the penny 
dropped’, and the verb ‘realised’ construct ‘anorexia’ as pre-existing and real, and 
waiting to be ‘discovered’. The use of psychiatric and biomedical language 
(‘anorexia’ and ‘illness’) also serve to reify the diagnosis. The ‘danger’ of the 
diagnosis is also indicated through the author’s description of her emotional state 
using the emotional metaphor: ‘I was filled with a sense of dread’. As discussed 
by Edwards (1999), emotion discourse can be drawn on to perform a number of 
rhetorical functions, and in this case the emotion metaphor appears to be used to 
construct the ‘seriousness’ of the ‘condition’.  
 
3.1.2.2. Mentally Ill: Irrational and Out of Control 
 
As mentioned previously, there is a clear tendency within the biomedical 
interpretive repertoire to construct those experiencing psychiatric distress as 
behaving irrationally. One example of this is the excerpt below, taken from the 
article ‘Should I tell my daughters the truth?’  
 
Extract: 15 
 
5  My mum suffered from depression and one of my earliest memories 
6  is seeing her sitting at the kitchen table, scratching her face and  
7  saying she wanted to die. 
8  It turned out that my grandma had also suffered mental health  
9  problems and I grew up convinced that it would be my fate too. 
10  Sure enough it was, although I’ve always been able to control my  
11  depression and managed to hide it from my two daughters. They’re  
12  now in their teens and I wonder if I should be honest with them. 
 
This letter opens with a description of the author’s mother in lines 5-7. In this 
description a dispositional formulation is used. Dispositional formulations are a 
type of script formulation, in which actions are constructed as being attributable to 
the disposition of an individual, including their moral, personal and pathological 
traits (Edwards, 1994). In this case, the author describes a distressing scene of 
her mother harming herself and speaking about wanting to die, and this is directly 
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attributed to her ‘depression’. The scene described is also made distressing by 
being constructed as one of the author’s ‘earliest memories’. Dominant 
discourses about children in the UK are of ‘innocence’, ‘vulnerability’ and these 
discourses come with moral implications about social responsibilities and the 
child’s ‘need for protection’ (Meyer, 2007). Within this context, the description of a 
distressing scene as an early memory can be seen to construct the behaviour as 
contravening an accepted moral norm (particularly for mothers) of protecting 
children. This serves to reinforce the notion that due to the pathological nature of 
her ‘depression’ she is behaving irrationally.  
 
Another example of ‘irrationality’ as a construct is demonstrated by the excerpt 
below, taken from the article ‘My life has been taken over’. 
 
Extract: 16 
 
8  I’m glad I have a diagnosis but I’m still struggling to manage my  
9  condition – I scrub the floors and surfaces of my house constantly  
10  and never invite anyone round in case they bring dirt or germs   
11  inside. I’ve lost all my friends and I’m so lonely. 
 
In this extract the author describes behaving in a way that is making her 
unhappy, but constructs this behaviour as out of her control due to her ‘condition’ 
(OCD). One way that this is constructed as out of control is the use of the term 
‘struggling’, which suggests difficulty and resistance despite the author’s best 
efforts. The author also draws on extreme case formulations (Pomerantz, 1986) 
through the use of the terms ‘constantly’, ‘never’ and ‘all’. The extreme nature of 
this construction emphasises to the reader both the irrationality and 
uncontrollability of the behaviours and the severity of the ‘condition’.   
 
A further example of the construction of psychiatric distress as irrational is shown 
below. This is taken from the article, ‘She says she slept with my hubby’.  
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Extract: 17 
 
17  ‘Because of my illness I’ve acted out of character and done things I  
18  regretted – including having an affair. Once it was over, I fell into a  
19  deep depression. 
 
In this extract the author directly attributes ‘out of character’ behaviour to her 
‘illness’ (bipolar disorder). This could arguably serve a number of functions. 
Firstly, it appears to mitigate the author from blame for the affair, as the 
behaviour is attributed to the ‘illness’ and therefore positioned outside of her 
control. This is reinforced by the statement ‘Once it was over, I fell into a deep 
depression’. ‘I fell’ positions the author as passive to the experience. In addition, 
Edwards (1997) argues that emotion words are routinely used to perform a range 
of functions, including attribution of blame or mitigation. By informing the reader 
that she ‘fell into a deep depression’, the author may be communicating a moral 
judgement on the affair, feeling guilt and shame, but powerlessness against it in 
the context of the lack of control associated with bipolar disorder. Whilst the 
externalisation of the behaviour in the above excerpt serves to mitigate blame, it 
arguably also positions the actions of those with a diagnosis of bipolar disorder 
as ‘irrational’ and ‘out-of-control’.  
 
3.1.2.3. Acceptance and the Need for Professional Management 
 
The final sub-section under the biomedical repertoire is ‘acceptance and the need 
for medical management’. Ten of the articles analysed explicitly referenced the 
need for medical intervention. Below is an excerpt taken from a letter written in 
response to the letter quoted in extract 16, and it provides information about the 
author’s own experience of ‘OCD’ and how she ‘manages’ the ‘condition’. 
 
Extract: 18 
 
16  ‘All I wanted was to lead a happy “normal” life, but I believed it 
17  would never be possible. In my darkest times, I even considered 
18  ending it all. 
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19  ‘However, with the right help and treatment, I’ve learnt how to 
20  control my compulsions, and I’m beginning to lead the kind of life I 
21  always dreamt of. 
22  ‘It won’t be long before you too get to this point. The hardest part is  
23  admitting your problems and facing them. You’ve done this. Now go 
24   and see your GP. 
 
In lines 16-21 the author has used the rhetorical device of contrast (Boyett, 
2008). By constructing her life prior to receiving ‘the right help and treatment’ as 
extremely distressing and almost intolerable, and life after as ‘beginning to lead 
the life I always dreamt of’, the author is able to demonstrate the significance and 
power of the treatment she received. This demonstration of the favourability of 
treatment serves to legitimise the author’s later instruction ‘Now go and see the 
GP’. In addition, as mentioned in reference to several of the pervious extracts, 
this command is further legitimised by the fact that the author is speaking from 
the position of her own experience. This acts as a corroboration and constructs 
her a more credible (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Gee, 2011). 
 
Also inherent in this excerpt is the reification of OCD (Potter, 1996). This is 
achieved through the use of ‘right’ when describing treatment in line 19, as this 
implies that there is a ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ way to respond to the to OCD, 
suggesting it as an observable, measurable and treatable ‘thing’. Similarly, in 
lines 22-23, the author states ‘The hardest part is admitting your problems and 
facing them.’ Again this positions the ‘problems’ (OCD) as ‘real’ and in need of 
‘acceptance’.  
 
A very similar example is demonstrated in the article ‘I feel so alone’: 
 
Extract: 19 
 
28  ‘It took me a long time to accept that I had mental health issues  
29  but once I faced up to them and got the right help, my life took a  
30  turn for the better. 
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These rhetorical devices work in conjunction with each other to justify and 
legitimize the need for medical intervention on the basis that psychiatric 
diagnoses are ‘real’ and ‘acceptance’ of the diagnosis is essential to restoring 
happiness or wellbeing. Again, these arguments are strengthened because in the 
‘agony-aunt’ format of these letters, the author is positioned as speaking from 
personal experience, corroborating the dominant psychiatric discourse (Edwards 
& Potter, 1992; Gee, 2011).  
 
A final example to demonstrate advocacy for medical intervention is shown 
below. This is taken from the article ‘She says she slept with my hubby’. 
 
Extract: 20 
 
21  ‘We split up and I tried to take my own life. I was hospitalised, and  
22  thanks to the wonderful doctors, I made a good recovery. My  
23  condition is now managed with regular counselling and medication. 
 
In this excerpt the use of the phrase ‘thanks to’ and the adjective ‘wonderful’ 
arguably positions the doctors as ‘rescuers’ or ‘saviours’, without whom she might 
not be alive. This construction therefore invites the reader to respond admirably 
and respectfully to the doctors and legitimizes related medical interventions. The 
author then goes on to explain that their ‘condition is now managed with regular 
counselling and medication’, again echoing discourses of physical ill-health and 
the need for medical management (Walker, 2006).  
 
3.1.2.4. Distress as a Biomedical Condition: Initial Summary and Reflections 
 
In contrast to the ‘distress as normal’ interpretive repertoire, there is very little 
mention made to ‘causes’ of distress within this repertoire, as if having a 
diagnosis is an explanation in itself as opposed to simply providing a label. 
Indeed, the use of psychiatric labels is associated with particular connotations 
about causation, including ideas about genetic vulnerability and neuro-chemical 
imbalances (Walker, 2006). Fitting with a biomedical formulation are the 
constructions of distress as potentially being inherited by family members 
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(‘Should I tell my daughters the truth?), and of being long-term and it the absence 
of any trigger (‘My life has been taken over’).  
 
Another important consideration of this repertoire is, as in the case of the 
previous repertoire, its associated recommendations for action. This is also 
inherently important in the context of CDA. In this case, frequent references are 
made to the need for ‘acceptance’ that one has a psychiatric illness. This echoes 
work critiquing ‘insight’ in the field of ‘psychosis’ and ‘schizophrenia’. Dillon 
(2011) describes ‘insight’ in a biomedical context as representing an individual’s 
acceptance ‘that they are ill and that the cause of their distress is biomedical’. 
She goes on to describe the social actions associated with this biomedical 
construct, which ‘most usually means that ‘help’ is in the form of reliance on, and 
compliance with, long-term use of psychotropic medications and other 
interventions that professionals deem to be useful’. Those who fail to have 
‘insight’, or in other words, those who have opposing views about the relevant 
factors contributing to their experience of distress, are seen as making ‘incorrect’ 
attributions – assuming that ‘psychologists and psychiatrists are privileged 
possessors of a correct theory of psychosis, which patients are foolish to dispute’ 
(Bentall, 2003). Whilst this body of work focuses primarily on psychosis, I would 
argue that the critique applies to a range of psychiatric labels. As represented in 
the magazines analysed, there is a pervasive notion that a person who does not 
‘accept’ a psychiatric diagnosis is in some form of ‘denial’ and cannot accept the 
‘truth’.  
 
Another implication of the medicalization of distress, is that by placing the 
pathology within the individual we are obscuring important sources of distress 
such as poverty, unemployment, poor relationships, social isolation, violence and 
oppression, meaning that such harmful processes go unchallenged (Boyle, 2011; 
Rapley, Moncrieff & Dillon, 2011). These issues will be considered in more detail 
in the discussion section. 
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3.1.3. Distress as a Matter of Personal Responsibility 
 
In this interpretive repertoire, distress is constructed as something manageable 
by the individual, given enough ‘work’ or personal effort. Two of the relevant 
articles analysed had an explicit ‘self-help’ focus, and a further three make 
explicit references to distress as something that the individual can control. This is 
in contrast to the previous section in which those diagnosed with psychiatric 
disorders were constructed as passive and out-of-control and advised to seek 
‘professional’ help. In the four articles which were not explicitly ‘self-help’ focused, 
there was also a construction of distress as something that should be hidden 
from others. These constructions and the rhetorical devices used to construct 
them will be demonstrated below using extracts from the articles. The following 
excerpt is taken from the article ‘Should I tell my daughters the truth?’ 
 
3.1.3.2. Personal Responsibility to Control Distress 
 
Below is an entire ‘self-help’ style article selected from the data corpus. Whilst 
this article focuses on anxiety, it mirrors (both in format and content) a very 
similar article on Seasonal Affective Disorder (SAD). 
 
Extract: 21 
 
1  How to… reduce anxiety 
2  More than one in five women say they suffer from anxiety most or  
3  all of the time. Here are some fast ways to tackle it… 
 
4  Check your diet 
5  What we eat can have a huge impact on our emotional state.  
6  Caffeine, for example, can intensify feelings of anxiety, trigger panic 
7  attacks, and increase nervousness and irritability. And high-GI  
8  foods such as white bread and sweets can cause blood-sugar  
9  swings, which also make you feel on edge.  
 
10  Get moving 
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11  Maintaining a regular exercise routine reduces stress and helps you 
12  to release tension. During exercise your brain releases serotonin, 
13  which improves your mood. 
 
14  Be positive 
15  Write down three things at the end of each day that went well or  
16  that you’re grateful for. The more you are able to see the positives 
17  in life, the less stressful most situations become. 
 
18  Take relaxed, slow breaths 
19  If you can relax your body, your brain often calms down too,  
20  overriding your anxiety. Sit comfortably in your chair and count to 
21  11 while breathing out. Then count to seven as you slowly breathe 
22  back in. 
 
23  Distract yourself 
24  Reading a book, talking to a friend, watching something good on TV 
25  or throwing yourself into a project at work can all distract you from  
26  anxiety. When you’re doing things, you have less time to worry. 
 
There is ambiguity here about whether ‘anxiety’ is being used in a clinical or lay 
sense, but without this being made explicit, several rhetorical devices have been 
employed to construct the information as ‘factual’. Firstly, the use of a statistic in 
the opening statement in lines 2-3 is an example of empiricist warranting, 
allowing for both the reification of anxiety as a commonly accepted and existing 
entity as well as presenting its reported prevalence as ‘fact’ (Edwards & Potter, 
1992; Potter, 1996). Secondly, there is extensive use of both physiological and 
biomedical language in reference to anxiety. In lines 5-9, the author of the article 
writes about the physiological impact of eating particular foods the impact this 
can have on emotional state. This draws on scientific discourse around anxiety 
that assumes in referring to anxiety, we are referring to an existing emotional 
‘entity’ that links to particular physiological and behavioural processes, as 
opposed to the idea that anxiety is a social construction (Hallam, 1985).  
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In lines 12-13, the reader is told ‘During exercise your brain releases serotonin, 
which improves your mood’. Again this draws on biomedical discourse, and 
specifically on neuro-chemical language, through the use of ‘serotonin’. This 
arguably draws on a number of rhetorical devices to present the information as 
‘fact’ and minimise challenge. Firstly, empiricist accounting is used, as ‘serotonin’ 
and its impact on the brain is treated as an objective phenomena in its own right, 
which is simply being factually reported by the author. In addition, the global 
statement made about the brain releasing serotonin, in turn improving mood, is 
an example of systematic vagueness, as the claim is made with no explanation of 
the mechanisms by which this is possible. Edwards & Potter (1992) suggest that 
global formulations can be difficult to rebut or challenge ‘while at the same time 
providing just the essentials to found a particular inference’ (p. 162).  
 
Importantly, in this particular article biomedical and physiological discourse are 
not just constructed as ‘part’ of the experience of anxiety, but are in fact 
positioned as being of primary significance. This is demonstrated in lines 19-20, 
where the reader is told ‘If you can relax your body, your brain often calms down 
too, overriding your anxiety’. The adjective ‘overriding’ signifies something that is 
of more importance than other factors, and therefore constructs the 
‘physiological’ as more powerful in the experience of distress than other factors, 
such as psycho-social factors.  
 
As mentioned previously, it was not only the ‘self-help’ style articles that made 
reference to a woman’s ability to ‘control’ or ‘manage’ her distress. This was also 
referenced in three of the ‘agony-aunt’ articles. For example, in the article ‘Abuse 
destroyed my life’, the author writes: ‘With time and hard work, your past will no 
longer affect you as it’s doing now’. Similarly, in another article about past abuse 
(‘I’m too scared to get intimate’), the author writes: ‘Letting go of your fears takes 
time and effort’.  In another similar example, the author writes: ‘Despite this, I’m 
picking myself back up again. It isn’t easy by any means, but it is possible’ (taken 
from ‘I feel so alone’). These descriptions of the process of recovery are 
examples of descriptions as attributions (Edwards & Potter, 1992). The 
references made to ‘effort’ and ‘hard work’ position the responsibility for recovery 
within the individual, positioning it as within their control.  
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3.1.3.3. Responsibility to Keep Quiet: Secrecy, Shame and Protecting Others 
 
Another feature of this interpretive repertoire is the construction of distress as 
something to ‘hide’. In four of the articles, two of which were ‘agony-aunt’ style 
articles and two of which were ‘real-life’ personal stories, the author made 
references to hiding their distress. An example from ‘Should I tell my daughters 
the truth?’ is demonstrated below. 
 
Extract: 22 
 
8  It turned out that my grandma had also suffered mental health  
9  problems and I grew up convinced that it would be my fate too. 
10  Sure enough it was, although I’ve always been able to control my  
11  depression and managed to hide it from my two daughters. They’re  
12  now in their teens and I wonder if I should be honest with them. 
 
In this excerpt we are told that the author was ‘able to control’ her ‘depression’ 
and that she ‘managed to hide it’ from her daughters. Implicit in this description is 
that it is desirable for her to ‘hide’ her depression. As mentioned previously in 
relation to another extract from this article, the dominant discourse surrounding 
childhood in the UK is that of innocence and vulnerability (Meyer, 2007), and 
therefore within this framework the reader is invited to assume that the author 
‘hid’ her depression to protect her children. This formulation also draws on role 
discourse (Edwards & Potter, 1992). Edwards and Potter (1992) postulate that 
actions can be justified or legitimised so long they are in keeping with a particular 
role or category assumed by the protagonist. In this case, therefore, the decision 
for a mother to hide ‘depression’ from her daughters is consistent with societal 
expectations about mothers (and women) as self-sacrificing and caring (Hays, 
1996; Williams, 1999). However, a number of assumptions are implicit in this 
construction. Firstly it is assumed that ‘depression’ is something that children 
need protection from, and is thus something potentially harmful for others to be 
‘exposed’ to. Secondly, there is assumption that mothers should ‘silence’ their 
own distress or needs for the sake of others.  
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Another extract which constructs distress as something to be hidden is shown 
below. This is taken from the article ‘Monster in the cupboard’. 
 
Extract: 23 
 
53  My nightmares about him returned and I suffered anxiety and  
54  flashbacks. I did my best to hide them. I didn’t want to worry Mum 
55  but I did agree to see a counsellor. 
 
This article refers to distress in relation to past sexual violence. Here the author 
states that she ‘did [her] best to hide’ ‘anxiety and flashbacks’. The use of the 
superlative ‘best’ constructs the author has having done everything within her 
capabilities to conceal her distress. The inclusion and placing of the following 
sentence ‘I didn’t want to worry Mum…’ suggests that this was the justification for 
hiding distress, in order to protect her mother. Again this is consistent with 
societal discourses about women and self-sacrifice (Hays, 1996; Williams, 1999). 
 
A final example is the following extract, taken from the article ‘Mum at breaking 
point’. 
 
Extract: 24 
 
71   I’d never contemplated suicide but I knew what the thoughts I was  
72   having meant.  
73   I didn’t dare tell Andrew about it, but I went to see my GP and I was  
74   diagnosed with severe clinical depression. 
 
In this extract the author describes having visions about taking her own life, and 
goes on to write ‘I didn’t dare tell Andrew [the author’s husband] about it, but I 
went to see my GP…’ The use of the verb ‘dare’ implies that it would take great 
courage or resolve to tell her husband about how she is feeling, although the 
reason for this is ambiguous. It could represent a shame or stigma around 
suffering, or it could represent a want to ‘protect’ her husband from how she is 
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feeling. The ambiguity in the text could suggest that there is an expectation that 
this would be implicitly understandable to the reader. One way this assumption 
could be understood is with reference to ‘script theory’, which suggests that we all 
have ‘mental scripts’ which tell us what to expect and how to respond in different 
social scenarios (Edwards, 1994). According to this theory, there would be an 
assumption that hiding distress represents a social ‘norm’.  
 
Whilst there were numerous examples in which psychiatric explanations of 
distress were constructed as something to be kept secret or hidden from others, 
there were exceptions to this pattern. Below is a respondent to the letter quoted 
in Extract 22 above. 
 
Extract: 25 
 
22  Hayley, 32: ‘There should be no stigma surrounding mental illness 
23  and they need to realise it’s nothing to be ashamed of. Tell them.’ 
 
In this extract, the author can be seen to directly challenge the assumption that 
‘depression’ should be kept secret. The use of definitive terminology such as 
‘should’ and ‘need’ constructs the importance and necessity of this claim, and the 
use of the verb ‘realise’ constructs the argument against stigma as ‘truth’, which 
needs to be ‘discovered’. However, it is important to consider the fact that, whilst 
this promotes an ‘anti-stigma’ view, it still constructs ‘mental illness’ as an existing 
pathology, thus reifying it (Potter, 1996). 
 
3.1.3.4. Distress as a Matter of Personal Responsibility: Initial Discussions 
 
In this repertoire distress as constructed as being manageable and controllable 
by the individual woman, given enough personal resolve. In many cases, distress 
is also constructed as something that should be hidden. In a critique of self-help 
literature, Kaminer (1992) argues that self-help is based on the notion that any 
individual has the capacity to ‘overcome circumstances of nature and class – but 
only through adherence to systems that are devised or discovered by experts’ (p.   
46). In particular, self-help directed towards improving or changing mental states 
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frequently suggests that a negative state of mind is at the heart of all problems, 
as opposed to ‘personal, political or social problems’ (Kaminer, 1992, p. 47). On 
this basis, it could be argued that by positioning women as able and responsible 
for managing or controlling their distress, we are fostering a false sense of 
empowerment and obscuring the wider socio-political determinants of distress. 
Historically it has also been argued by some feminist writers that self-help has 
been employed to encourage women to adjust to and accept domestic care-
giving (Hansen, McHoul & Rapley, 2003).  
 
The notion that women should keep their distress hidden and secret is also 
arguably problematic. In the literature there is evidence to suggest that public 
attitudes towards psychiatric diagnoses negatively impacts those with such labels 
in a number of ways, including the direct treatment of those with a diagnosis, the 
institutional treatment they receive and internalized stigma (Angermeyer and 
Dietrich, 2006). Assumptions about keeping psychiatric labels (or experiences 
that may be interpreted as psychiatric disorders) hidden could therefore be 
considered understandable in this context.  
 
Whilst stigma may be one explanation for secrecy, it also appeared to be the 
case in at least some articles that the primary reason for secrecy was to ‘protect 
others’. This may be in part due to a want to protect loved ones from the effects 
of societal stigma, however it may also represent a dominant discourse in 
Eurocentric societies that constructs women as ‘selfless’ (Gilligan, 1982; Martin, 
2003). According to Gilligan (1982), this relates to the construction of women as 
primarily relational, and therefore any behaviour or disclosure that could threaten 
relationships also create a threat to the woman’s sense of self. The result is that 
women put the needs of others ahead of their own (Gilligan, 1982; Martin, 2003). 
The implications of the construction of women as ‘selfless’ will be considered 
further in the discussion section. 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
In this section I will first revisit the research questions and summarise the findings 
from the analysis section. In this process I also intend to expand on the analyses 
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by considering in more depth the implications of the findings on women and wider 
socio-political implications. This is consistent with CDA, in which the aim is to 
expose the roles discourse assumes in (re)producing social inequalities 
(Richardson, 2007). In addition to exploring the potentially harmful impact of such 
discourses, I also intend to reflect on who benefits and how such discourses are 
maintained. I will then go on to reflect on the implications for further research and 
for clinical practice. In this section I hope to apply the learning from the analysis 
and consider explicitly how Clinical Psychology can challenge harmful practices. I 
will then move on to a critical review section, and finish with concluding 
comments. 
 
4.1. Research Aims Revisited 
4.1.1. To critically analyse the way in which mental health and psychological 
distress are constructed in a widely read magazine targeted at women, with a 
particular focus on areas where the greatest gender divide exists 
 
Throughout the analysis section I have aimed to clearly identify the key 
repertoires used to construct distress. In summary, these were the ‘distress as a 
normative reaction’ repertoire, the ‘distress as a biomedical condition’ repertoire, 
and the ‘distress as a matter of personal responsibility’ repertoire. Throughout the 
analysis I have endeavoured to identify and describe the different rhetorical 
means employed to create convincing constructions, and have begun to explore 
some of the potential implications of the different repertoires, both for individual 
women and wider socio-political implications. I will now explore the implications in 
more depth in the following section.  
 
4.1.2. To discuss the potential impact this may have on women’s understanding 
of their own mental health and psychological distress 
 
4.1.2.1. Distress as a Normative Reaction: Key Implications 
 
In this repertoire psycho-social experiences that are culturally accepted as 
legitimate causes of distress were posited as ‘causes’ for ‘depression’. By 
drawing on commonly distressing experiences and placing them within a 
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psychiatric framework, this repertoire arguably serves to medicalize ‘normal’ life 
events in women. This echoes research by Metzl and Angel (2004), referenced in 
the introductory section of this thesis. In an analysis of pharmaceutical company 
advertisements for anti-depressant medication, Metzl and Angel (2004) found a 
gradual widening of categories of experiences relevant to women that were 
constructed as ‘pathological/treatable’ as opposed to ‘normal/acceptable’. The 
medicalization of normal life experiences of women has many implications. 
Firstly, relying on media as a key source of information about mental health 
(Kalafetalis & Dowden 1997), women may too readily construct their own ‘normal’ 
experiences as symptomatic of pathology requiring professional intervention. This 
is consistent with findings from Kessler et al (1981) who noted that women are 
more likely to label their emotional experience as a recognised emotional 
‘problem’. 
 
The ramifications of having a psychiatric label or being advised to seek 
‘professional’ help in the form of Clinical Psychology, counselling or psychiatry 
can be devastating for some. Stigma in relation to psychiatric labels can have 
widespread and harmful effects including discriminatory treatment from others, 
impact on policy and ‘self-stigma’ (Angermeyer and Dietrich, 2006). With regards 
to self-stigma, it is possible that if women are to internalise the messages about 
pathology from the media, they may be more inclined to see themselves as 
unable and unfit, potentially impacting on multiple life domains.  
 
In addition to direct implications for women, there are also a number of socio-
political implications of medicalizing women’s normal life events. Firstly, by 
placing the site of pathology in the woman, the harmful effects of the life events 
or social roles themselves remain unquestioned and unchallenged (Boyle, 2011; 
Ussher, 2010). As is consistent with CDA, it is important to reflect on the power 
structures that allow such harmful practices to continue. It could be argued that 
by pathologising women’s normal experiences and advocating professional 
intervention, many powerful institutions are benefitting at the expense of women. 
Firstly, traditional Clinical Psychology operates on the assumption that we are 
able to alleviate an individual’s distress by attending to the psychological 
processes through which the world is experienced (Smail, 2011). Consequently, 
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should the individual’s distress be seen as a legitimate response to the ‘noxious 
influences of a real, material world’, as opposed to pathological psychological 
processes, Clinical Psychology risks being rendered useless (Smail, 2011). 
 
Boyle (2011) argues that Clinical Psychology also colludes with the avoidance of 
examining socio-political context to avoid challenge from powerful groups such as 
psychiatry or government bodies. In exchange for this, she goes on to argue, 
Clinical Psychology is able to maintain particular academic and professional 
privileges. Psychiatry can arguably be seen to have similar vested interests in the 
pathologisation of distress, although this will be discussed in greater detail in the 
‘biomedical’ section below.  
 
From a feminist perspective, there is arguably much to be gained from the 
avoidance of exposing operations of power. By pathologising women’s distress in 
relation to issues such as victimisation and the burden of their social roles, the 
powerful (for example, government agencies) are not obliged to address social 
and gender inequality (Boyle, 2011). In order to illustrate this point, I draw on the 
work of Vine and Kindersley (2009), who estimated that if women in the UK were 
to be paid for the caring work they undertake as a normal part of their social role, 
the cost would be an estimated 739 billion pounds a year. This can be seen to 
demonstrate the potential incentive in maintaining women in ‘caring’ roles.  
 
4.1.2.2. Distress as a Biomedical Condition: Key Implications 
 
Many implications of the previous repertoire also apply to biomedical 
constructions of distress. Namely, the individualisation of distress and 
pathologisation of women, and the advocated deference to ‘professionals’. 
However, in this repertoire, women’s distress is arguably taken even further out 
of social context, with no mention of psycho-social circumstances surrounding 
distress. Another key difference in this repertoire was the presence of numerous 
negative connotations associated with having a psychiatric label. As highlighted, 
these included being out of control, irrational and potentially dangerous. 
Unfortunately, these characteristics mirror unhelpful constructions of ‘mental 
disorder’ found to be commonly held in public discourse and media depictions 
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(Rose et al, 2007; Wahl, 1992), although some evidence suggests that more 
favourable attitudes are demonstrated towards common mental health ‘disorders’ 
(Angermeyer, 2002). As discussed above, such conceptualisations could have 
considerable implications for experienced stigma and self-stigma (Angermeyer 
and Dietrich, 2006).  
 
Conceptualisations of distress as biomedical in nature also serve to legitimise 
medical and pharmacological ‘treatment’ for diagnosed individuals. As discussed 
in the introduction section of this thesis, this can have serious implications for 
individuals prescribed psychotropic drugs, which often come with a whole host of 
physically unpleasant and potentially harmful side-effects (Bentall, 2010; Davies, 
2013). In addition to the physical side-effects, research has also indicated that 
‘patients’ may also experience a number of unwanted emotional side-effects, 
including a sense of emotional detachment towards loved ones such as partners 
or children (Price, Cole & Goodwin, 2009). It may also be important to note that 
some anti-depressant medications are actually associated with a greater 
likelihood of the ‘patient’ ending their life (Healy & Whitaker, 2003).  
 
As well as the harmful direct effects on women outlined above, there are also a 
number of socio-political implications for the medicalization of women’s distress. 
Much of this echoes the discussion above, and in particular medicalized 
discourses serve to keep socio-political injustices hidden (Boyle, 2011). 
Consistent with a CDA approach, in the previous section I began to deconstruct 
the operations of power which serve to maintain the medicalization of misery, and 
in particular the medicalization of women’s misery. In this section I would like to 
consider in more detail the role of psychiatry and the pharmaceutical industry.  
 
With regards to psychopharmacological treatment, a further criticism in addition 
to the potentially harmful side-effects is that of effectiveness. In two large scale 
meta-analysis studies, Kirsch et al (2002; 2008) found that whilst there is a strong 
therapeutic response to anti-depressant medication, the response is only 
marginally less for placebo. In other words, whilst the drug effects of anti-
depressants are not significant, the placebo effects are (Kirsch, 2011). However, 
in spite of questionable evidence for many psychopharmacological treatments 
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their use has continued to grow exponentially (Davies, 2013). Davies (2013) 
argues that this has been achieved through increasingly sophisticated marketing 
campaigns to support an industry worth billions of pounds. According to Moncrieff 
(2011), the central feature of this marketing campaign has involved selling a 
‘disease-based model’ of drug treatment, suggesting that medication corrects a 
disease process in the brain, as opposed to a ‘drug-based model’ which is better 
supported by historical accounts and research evidence. Moncrieff (2011) argues 
that:  
 
“Few people are aware that these concepts have their origins, not in 
robust scientific research, but rather in the interests of a psychiatric 
profession desperate to cement its professional position, and in the 
marketing tactics of the pharmaceutical industry” (p. 188). 
 
As argued by Moncrieff (2011), the psychiatric profession also has investment in 
the medicalization of distress. Firstly, the very definition of psychiatric disorder is 
based on the assumption that the person is demonstrating or describing 
experiences which are not “an expectable and culturally sanctioned response” 
and which are “a manifestation of a behavioural, psychological or biological 
dysfunction in the individual” (Boyle, 2011, p. 36). In light of this, any suggestion 
that distress is meaningful and not pathological challenges the central tenets of 
psychiatry (Boyle, 2011). In addition, the psychiatric profession has a vested 
interest in the success of psychopharmacological treatment because the 
introduction of such drugs have been pivotal in establishing psychiatry as a 
‘science’ (Moncrieff, 2011). 
 
In light of this evidence, Kirsch (2011) argues that the central causes of 
depression (and other psychiatric ‘disorders’) need to be addressed. He argues 
that depression is associated with unemployment, poverty, poor education and 
unaffordable housing. In addition, Kirsch (2010) draws attention to evidence that 
people who benefit most from psychological and psychiatric interventions are 
white, well paid and well educated. 
 
69 
 
4.1.2.3. Distress as a Matter of Personal Responsibility: Key Implications 
 
In this repertoire distress is constructed as ‘manageable’, with women being 
encouraged to overcome their distress with their own determination, or at least 
manage it well enough to hide it from others. This could arguably have a number 
of potential implications for women, including a felt sense of responsibility that 
they ‘should’ be managing, and ‘should’ be keeping distress from others so as not 
to burden them. As mentioned briefly in the analysis section, this appears to be 
consistent with a dominant discourse in Western societies that stipulates that 
women should be ‘self-sacrificing’, particularly in the context of certain roles such 
as motherhood (Hays, 1996; Williams, 1999).  
 
Also implicit in self-help or similar advisory literature is the implication that 
anyone, given the right techniques, could overcome their cultural situation and 
take on more positive forms (Hansen, McHoul & Rapley, 2003; Kaminer, 1992). 
This could have a significant impact on the distress of individual women who may 
self-pathologise their dissatisfaction or unhappiness in the context of specified 
gender roles or gender inequality (Watson & Williams, 1992). 
 
Self-help discourse, clearly, also has socio-political implications. Like the 
discussions in the previous repertoires, this construction serves to individualise 
distress and obscure factors such as gender inequality (Watson & Williams, 
1992). As in the previous sections, it is important to consider the operations of 
power that are enabling these actions. The self-help industry is a lucrative one, 
and is dependent on positioning audiences (who are primarily women) as being 
in control of their misery and able to change it, whilst also being endlessly 
dependent on self-help and advice about feelings (Hansen, McHoul & Rapley, 
2003). The self-help industry may therefore benefit both magazine companies 
which include such articles, as well as ‘psy-professionals’, by making profits and 
selling psychologised or medicalised notions of distress to women (Hansen, 
McHoul & Rapley, 2003). Smail (2011) argues that there is a dominant cultural 
discourse in UK society which suggests ‘that our survival and success depend on 
our personal initiative and our ability to exercise responsibility (precisely the 
attributes so stifled, we are led to believe, by the ‘outmoded’ welfare state)’ 
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(Smail, 2011, p. 237). Smail (2011) argues that this cultural belief legitimises 
psychotherapy as a profession, as individuals are primed to see themselves as 
culpable for their social circumstances and distress, and view psychotherapy as a 
route to ‘self-improvement’. I would also argue that a similar argument applies to 
psychiatric management of distress. 
 
 Finally, it could also be argued that self-help and ‘responsibility for well-being’ 
discourses benefit other powerful individuals and agencies such as men and 
governmental bodies, because, in a similar way to the previous repertoires, if the 
site of pathology is in the woman, there is no responsibility to tackle political and 
social issues that cause distress (Boyle, 2011; Watson & Williams, 1992).  
 
4.2. Implications 
4.2.3. Implications for Future Research 
 
One aspect of this research that was unique compared with previous research 
into women and distress in the media was the identification of a magazine that 
targeted women who, demographically, are most over-represented in anxiety and 
depression diagnoses. During the literature search I was not able to find any such 
examples, with similar studies targeting magazines that were widely read but not 
most commonly by women of lower socioeconomic status or women of the most 
‘high-risk’ age range, or investigating popular newspapers that were not gender-
specific (Bengs et al, 2008; Gattuso et al, 2005). I believed this provided a strong 
justification for researching the chosen magazine, but I am aware of the 
limitations of claiming generalizability of the findings on this basis and I have 
therefore endeavoured to make tentative claims and refer to supporting evidence 
in the literature. One possibility for future research could be to conduct a similar 
form of analysis on other forms of mass media targeted at women who are most 
over-represented and often most disempowered. I am aware that whilst I chose 
the best-selling women’s weekly magazine in the UK that met my criteria, the 
sales statistics are still well below the viewer statistics for a great number of 
television programs, with television being the most consumed form of media in 
the UK (Diggs-Brown, 2011). In addition, research suggests that issues related to 
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mental health are frequently depicted in television programming (Cutcliffe & 
Hannigan, 2001). An interesting option for future research could therefore be to 
conduct an analysis of the construction of distress or psychiatric disorder in 
women in television programmes targeted at adult women who are mothers and 
of a lower socioeconomic status.  
 
In addition, the current research focused solely on the language used in articles 
to construct distress, rather than also researching the visual component of 
articles. It could be argued that the analysis may have been enhanced by also 
taking the visual component of articles into consideration, such as accompanying 
images, charts, graphs and layout (Jäger & Maier, 2009), as these may have 
contributed to the rhetorical devices used. For example, the presentation of 
charts and graphs next to an informative column may have contributed to the 
construction of empiricist or factual discourse. Further research in this area, 
whether looking at data from magazines or television, may therefore benefit from 
analysing the visual in addition to the content of text.  
 
A further consideration is one of power. A central value of this research was 
addressing gender inequality, and consistent with the principles of CDA, the 
project was conducted with the aim of actively challenging social inequalities with 
the hope of instigating meaningful change for women. As a white middle class 
woman and Trainee Clinical Psychologist and researcher, I am arguably in a 
position of considerable power in relation to many women accessing mental 
health services, who, as discussed previously often tend to be from 
disadvantaged groups (Belle, 1990; Hudson, 2005; Kessler et al, 1994; Lipman, 
Offord & Boyle, 1997). A valuable future direction for research could therefore 
involve the direct engagement of women from these groups in the research 
process. This could provide numerous benefits, but primarily I would like to reflect 
on the moral issue of power and participation. As highlighted by Beresford 
(2012), power and participation are inexplicably linked, with those in power (be 
they individuals, groups or institutions) being able to force less powerful 
individuals or groups to act in a specific way, even if this is against their will or not 
in their interests (Beresford, 2012). By involving women labelled with common 
psychiatric diagnoses in research, we are engaging in ‘service-user activism’ 
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which aims to address the inherent power imbalance between mental health 
professionals and service-users by making service-user voices more visible 
(Sweeney, 2013). This is of specific relevance to this research, as those women 
given psychiatric diagnoses are often the victims of damage caused by the 
medicalization of misery (Sweeney, 2013).  
 
In addition, as touched on multiple times throughout this project, our own values 
and experiences as researchers will inevitable shape the research process. 
Given this, it is arguably both valuable and important to incorporate the voices of 
the disempowered in this process in a meaningful way, rather than simply 
reflecting the voices and agendas of those more powerful (Sweeney, 2013). By 
involving women who have used services or received psychiatric diagnoses, we 
are likely to gain new insights into methods of data selection, collection and 
analysis.  
 
4.2.4. Implications for Clinical Practice 
 
On the basis of my research findings I suggest three key implications for the 
discipline of Clinical Psychology. Firstly, I advocate for Clinical Psychology (and 
specifically critical approaches to Clinical Psychology) to engage more directly 
with the media. This is with the aim of challenging dominant cultural constructions 
of distress as rendering ‘sufferers’ passive and in need of professional 
intervention. Secondly, I suggest ways to limit collusion with a psychiatric model 
and discourses of personal responsibility for well-being in the context of one-to-
one psychological therapy. Finally, I consider meaningful steps by which Clinical 
Psychology can engage with the causes of distress. By ‘causes’ I refer to the 
structural and socio-political inequalities discussed throughout this thesis and 
demonstrated to be key in understanding distress. 
 
4.2.4.1. Clinical Psychology and Engagement with the Media 
 
In the introductory section of this thesis, I discussed the power of the media in 
shaping public attitudes and knowledge about health and mental health (Ussher, 
2010; Blum & Stracuzzi, 2004; Kalafetalis & Dowden, 1997), and in contributing 
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to psycho-social problems (Cusumano & Thompson, 2000; Davies, 2013; Grabe 
et al, 2008; Lynch et al, 2001; Watters, 2010). The findings of this study suggest 
that the main constructions of psychological and psychiatric distress apparent in 
the texts may have harmful implications. This is also consistent with previous 
research discussed in the introductory, analysis and discussion sections of this 
thesis (Blum and Stracuzzi, 2004; Gardner, 2003; Gattuso et al, 2005; Metzl & 
Angel, 2004). In addition, it is of note that Clinical Psychology had no mention in 
the data set, with references to talking therapies consisting of ‘counselling’ and 
‘cognitive-behavioural therapy’ only. On this basis I would advocate that Clinical 
Psychology (and in particular, critical approaches to Clinical Psychology) should 
be doing more to engage with the mass media. However, this may well be met 
with challenges, and influencing public opinion raises issues with regards to both 
the effectiveness of such interventions, and ethical considerations about whose 
opinion should be changed and whose should be valued.  
 
Whilst there are some powerful recent examples of Clinical Psychologists 
engaging with the mass media, these voices are arguably still marginalised and 
side-lined in favour of biomedical and psychiatric frameworks, and this is 
highlighted by the findings of both this study and those referenced in the previous 
paragraph. A recent exception to this was the statement issued by the 
Department of Clinical Psychology (DCP) of the British Psychological Society 
(BPS) in response to the publication of the most recent Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, the DSM-V (BPS, 2012). This statement openly 
critiqued the psychiatric framework for distress on the basis of the lack of 
evidence for biological causes, and the extensive catalogue of research linking 
psycho-social factors to distress (BPS, 2012). In the context of a critical 
psychology perspective, I would argue that this was a powerful example of a 
number of prominent Psychologists collaborating to engage with the media, 
challenge biomedical conceptualisations of distress and present alternative ideas. 
However, I would argue that this story was most widely reported in media 
targeted at those interested in critical approaches to mental health, and to 
middle-class left wing readership. This is illustrated by searching the BPS 
response in the search engine ‘Google’, which returns articles in The Guardian 
newspaper (The Guardian, 2013) and ‘The Hearing Voices Network’ (Hearing 
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Voices Network, 2013) on the first page of results. Whilst I would still advocate for 
Clinical Psychologist’s engagement with such media outlets and organisations, I 
would also argue that by engaging with media outlets that do not target those 
most over-represented individuals in mental health services, we are potentially 
limited in our interventions as we may not reach the most disadvantaged groups. 
On this basis I would argue that Clinical Psychologists need to find innovative 
ways to engage with media outlets that target disadvantaged groups. 
 
In addition to the challenge of engaging with media targeted at disadvantaged 
groups, Sayce (2000) also argues that changing public ideas about psychiatric 
explanations of distress is often unsuccessful due to the pervasiveness of the 
biomedical conceptual framework. However, she goes on to argue, based on the 
literature, that the public may be less cynical about alternative conceptions when 
messages are delivered by ‘trustworthy’ sources, and in particular, service-users 
themselves who challenge stereotypes (Sayce, 2000; Wolff et al, 1996a). In 
addition, evidence suggests that media-based interventions have more impact 
when backed by ongoing community-based education and action (Barker et al, 
1993; Wolff et al, 1996a). This evidence provides a rationale for community-
based social action as a key part of psychological therapy. This will be discussed 
further in section 3.2.4.3. 
 
3.2.4.2. Feminism and Psychotherapy 
 
In the context of traditional one-to-one talking therapy, Clinical Psychologists 
could actively draw on feminist thought with the hope of countering ‘ideologies 
that ignore, deny and obscure the existence of sexual and social inequalities’ 
(Watson & Williams, 1992). Whilst some feminist academics have argued that 
feminism and therapy are in themselves contradictory (with feminism focusing on 
material and social change, and therapy on psychological change) (Kitzinger & 
Perkins, 1993), I would argue that feminist principles can be used in a number of 
ways to counter harmful practices in psychological therapy and limit collusion with 
psychiatric frameworks (Boyle, 1997). However, I acknowledge that these are 
likely to be most effective when used alongside social and political interventions. 
Watson and Williams (1992) suggest that feminist practice represents an 
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approach to therapy rather than the prescription of particular techniques, and 
advocates the addressing of power imbalances between client and therapist and 
the explicit commitment to bring society and issues of sexual inequality into 
therapy.  
 
Stoppard (2000) describes a number of ways that the goals outlined above can 
be achieved, including the therapist’s adoption of the role of collaborator rather 
than ‘expert’ in an effort to counteract the lack of personal power women may 
experience in their personal lives. Stoppard (2000) also draws on adaptations 
made to specific approaches to take women’s experience into account. To 
illustrate this point she describes cognitive therapy approaches which focus on 
changing assumptions about women’s role of responsibility for pleasing the family 
and subjugating her own needs (Hurst & Genest, 1995; Stoppard, 2000). Whilst 
not a substitute for socio-political interventions, I would argue that by integrating 
such ideas into talking therapy, Clinical Psychologists are better able to 
acknowledge the ‘real’ of women’s distress and make this more visible within the 
socio-political context as opposed to situating a pathology within the woman.  
 
3.2.4.3. Clinical Psychology and Social Action: A Community Psychology 
Approach 
 
Finally, in addition to engaging with the media and integrating feminist theory into 
psychological therapy, the findings of this thesis also indicate that as Clinical 
Psychologists, we need to be doing more to target the central causes of distress. 
As argued throughout this thesis, evidence suggests that distress stems from 
systemic factors such as social inequality, gender inequality, poverty and 
oppression (Boyle, 2011; Kirsch, 2011; Smail, 2011). Should this be the case, it 
provides a powerful rationale for why Psychologists, whose very business is in 
distress, should be actively working to target these issues. This is consistent with 
a Community Psychology approach to working with distress (Orford, 2008). 
Within such a framework, factors such as income distribution, social class, work 
conditions, and people’s sense of community are seen as central to the 
psychological work (Orford, 2008). Within this approach, the Psychologist often 
takes on a number of different roles in addition to (or instead of) the traditional 
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‘therapist’ role, with aims varying from establishing personal, relational and/or 
collective wellbeing (Prilleltensky & Nelson, 2010). The work often has a 
preventative or early intervention focus, in that it targets the socio-political 
determinants of distress. In order to achieve these goals, Community 
Psychologists may collaborate with disadvantaged groups to promote community 
development and social action and to engage in research as well as working with 
individuals or groups to expose and challenge internalised stigma or oppression 
(Prilleltensky & Nelson, 2010).   
 
Consistent with a Community Psychology approach, Holland (1990) argues that 
as Clinical Psychologists we are in a position to challenge gender bias in mental 
health provision and that one way in which to do this is to set up innovative 
services that actively target disadvantaged groups. This could arguably be used 
as a method to challenge Clinical Psychology’s collusion with psychiatry by 
providing services and therapies according to diagnosis (Boyle, 1997), as well as 
actively implementing Community Psychology principles into psychological work. 
With respect to this research, there is arguably justification for the implementation 
of services targeted to adult women from lower socioeconomic status 
backgrounds, with a specific focus on lone mothers and those living in poverty. 
The White City Project set up by Holland (1990) is an excellent example of a 
Community Psychology project set up in collaboration with this very 
demographic. The project successfully demonstrated that women service-users 
can be enabled to set up local services which promote the idea of mental health 
as a community responsibility whilst retaining a group of mental health 
professionals as ‘back-up’ for support. This project involved more traditional one-
to-one psychotherapy as well as ‘consciousness raising’ about social issues and 
their relevance to mental health. In concordance with this, women were 
supported to successfully lobby for action and social change in their local 
communities (Holland, 1990). I would argue that this model therefore provides a 
basis and rationale for the development of similar services elsewhere. 
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4.3. Critical Review 
In this section I plan to critically appraise this research, taking into account 
methodological limitations and research quality. 
 
4.3.1. Critical Review: Reflections on the Research 
 
In this section I plan to present some initial reflections on the research before 
providing a more in-depth critique in the following sections. I will begin by 
reflecting on the use of a ‘hybrid’ approach, drawing on both DP and CDA. Using 
both approaches had the benefit of allowing me to examine the particular 
rhetorical strategies used in the text (using DP) whilst also creating space to 
recognise the power of media text and reflect on how particular 
conceptualisations of distress may be contributing to the medicalization of 
women’s distress and positioning women in ways that may be to their 
disadvantage (using CDA). However, in practice, the analysis in this research 
drew more heavily on DP than CDA approaches, using CDA as a ‘critical 
perspective’ (van Dijk, 2009). This is opposed to ‘pure’ CDA approaches outlined 
by Fairclough (1995) and Richardson (2007), in which a more thorough analysis 
of the production and consumption of journalism is conducted, with the aim of 
highlighting relationships between journalism and social ideas and particular 
(often powerful) institutions. Whilst these analyses would have been interesting 
and relevant in the context of this research, this would have been difficult to 
include given both the size and time limitations associated with doctoral thesis 
research. The combination of these approaches may therefore have been 
somewhat ambitious in this research project. 
 
A further reflection on the research relates to the use of a DP approach with 
artificial text. DP represents a useful approach when working with magazine and 
newspaper texts, and this is supported by an example included in Potter and 
Wetherell’s (1987) book, ‘Discourse and Psychology’, which focuses on a 
newspaper article. However, DP as an approach is more commonly used to 
examine how language is used in naturally occurring speech to perform particular 
social functions (such as make an attribution of blame, or construct something as 
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fact) (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Edwards, 1999; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). When 
using DP in the context of media text, as is the case in this research, it is 
important to note that the particular rhetorical devices and interpretive repertoires 
used in the texts are likely to be a creation of journalists and media production 
processes, rather than reflect the language use of the identified ‘authors’ of the 
text (readers who have written to the magazine).  
 
The final reflection included in this section relates to the analysis, and in 
particular the impact of a critical approach to biomedical constructions of distress. 
As highlighted throughout this research, as a critical psychologist and researcher 
I regard biomedical and psychiatric notions of misery and distress as problematic, 
believing they position people in ways that disadvantage them and obscure the 
role of harmful social and political processes (Boyle, 2011; Dillon, 2011; Smail, 
2011). However, I am aware that the use of a critical ‘anti-biomedical’ lens in 
analysis could mean that some of the more helpful or constructive aspects of the 
interpretive repertoires ‘Distress as a normative reaction’ and ‘Distress as a 
matter of personal responsibility’ were obscured or unappreciated. This was 
particularly the case because in most instances, articles that constructed distress 
as a normative reaction simultaneously advocated for the individual to seek help 
from a medical professional. This meant that the more helpful connotations such 
as the normalisation of distress in particular contexts may not have been fully 
appreciated. Similarly, articles constructing distress as a matter of personal 
responsibility were frequently associated with secrecy and shame, which may 
have detracted from some of the more useful connotations of personal agency 
and power.    
 
4.3.2. Methodological Limitations 
 
4.3.2.1. Magazine Data: Magazine as a Business 
 
The data used was ‘naturally occurring data’ as appropriate for DP and CDA 
approaches. However, it is important to consider the context within which this 
data arose. For the purpose of this research the magazine was conceptualised as 
a ‘business’ and the reader as a ‘consumer’. Given this, it is important to consider 
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the notion that the magazine will likely be drawing on strategies to establish and 
maintain readership loyalty and increase sales and revenue (Richardson, 2007). 
In addition, an important point to note is that ‘personal stories’ printed in the 
magazine were advertised as paid, with readers being encouraged to share their 
own personal stories in exchange for a payment of up to two thousand pounds. 
Both the pressure on journalists to produce entertaining or interesting literature, 
and the financial incentive to readers to provide personal stories could have 
resulted in the creation of fictional stories.  
 
Whilst this is worth noting, this research is based on the premise that language 
represents or reflects social ‘realities’ (or dominant discourses) whilst also 
contributing to social realities (Richardson, 2007). On this basis, it is not the 
‘reality’ of the story that is of primary importance, but rather the constructions it 
uses and the potential impact this may have on the reader, or indeed on wider 
discourses in society.  
 
4.3.2.2. Data Analysis: Discourse Analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis 
  
According to Potter and Wetherell (1987), the focus of discursive psychology is 
exclusively on discourse itself. In other words, it solely aims to understand and 
describe how concepts are constructed and what the resultant social functions 
are of particular constructions. This is based on the social constructionist view 
that language is not simply the straightforward communication of what is in the 
speaker’s ‘mind’, but rather a social action deployed to perform a particular 
function (Burr, 2003). For this reason, DP has been critiqued for not addressing 
questions of subjectivity (Willig, 2013). This means that whilst we can use DP to 
investigate public discourse, we cannot use it to explore internalised 
manifestations of discourse such as thought or sense of self (Willig, 2013). 
Additionally, DP focuses on how and why people deploy particular rhetorical 
devices to negotiate or manage particular interactions. By definition of this focus, 
DP does not allow for the exploration of why people adopt particular discursive 
objects. For example, why do speakers work so hard to disclaim particular 
attributions, and why do different speakers adopt or avoid using particular 
strategies (Willig, 2013). A final critique is that discursive approaches to data 
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analysis tend to limit the analysis to the texts that constitute the data, therefore 
ignoring the wider social and material context surrounding the text (Willig, 2013). 
 
In order to counter some of the criticisms, I adopted a hybrid approach, drawing 
on both DP and CDA. This is because I was interested in the medicalization of 
distress in women as a particular social problem, and was therefore interested in 
how distress was constructed as well as the potential social impact of these 
constructions. The use of a discursive approach would have allowed me to 
explore the way in which distress had been constructed, and what rhetorical 
devices had been deployed to make arguments convincing and relevant. 
However, had a ‘pure’ DP approach been used, limited conclusions could have 
been drawn in relation to the potential impact of constructions of distress on 
readers. Similarly, I would have been limited in my ability to reflect on why 
particular constructions are used and who benefits from such constructions (such 
as Psychologists, Psychiatrists, or companies that own media outlets). I therefore 
drew on both DP and CDA throughout my analysis and discussions to allow me 
to focus my analysis on both the ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ levels of social construction 
(Burr, 2003).  
 
Whilst the use of a hybrid approach had the advantage of allowing me to direct 
my analysis at both the ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ levels of social construction, I am 
aware that there may be inherent limitations in mixing different approaches, 
which could lead to a loss of coherence and integration in the research (Willig, 
2013). However, I believe that such issues have been minimised through the 
adoption of an epistemological stance fitting to both approaches. In addition, 
neither DP nor CDA provide a prescriptive mechanical procedure for analysing 
data and producing findings (Fairclough, 2001; Potter & Wetherell, 1987), so by 
drawing on both approaches I was not straying from a particular identified, ‘valid’ 
way of conducting analysis. Indeed it has been argued by some researchers that 
by adhering too closely to a ‘ready-made’ methodology, one can risk 
compromising one’s critical thinking and creativity (Chamberlain, 2012; Willig, 
2013), and it can therefore be preferable to draw on different approaches to 
provide different insights (Willig, 2013).  
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4.3.3. Quality Assurance 
 
Many contradictory positions are held about the appropriateness and usefulness 
of evaluating qualitative research (Spencer & Ritchie, 2012). It has been claimed 
that from a social constructionist perspective, the imposition of ‘criteria’ by which 
to judge quality are inappropriate, given that a consensus on quality would be 
arbitrary in an epistemological framework of multiple truths (Smith, 1984). 
However, it is possible to evaluate the quality of qualitative research within a 
framework of ‘guiding ideals’ as opposed to specific positivist criteria (Seale, 
1999).  The framework I will use to assess the quality of this research is that 
outlined by Spencer and Ritchie (2012), which attends to issues of contribution, 
credibility and rigour.  
 
4.3.3.1. Contribution 
 
Contribution refers to the value and relevance of research evidence (Spencer & 
Ritchie, 2012). By definition, research adopting a CDA methodology is action-
oriented, and therefore explicitly aims to explore and expose the roles discourse 
assumes in (re)producing social inequalities (Richardson, 2007). My hope is that 
this research builds on and brings together previous research critiquing the 
medicalization of women’s distress (e.g. Ussher, 2010) and the potentially 
powerful and harmful role the media plays in promoting psychological and 
psychiatric constructions of distress (Hansen, McHoul & Rapley, 2003; Rose, 
1998). 
 
My hope is that, in addition to complementing previous research in this field, the 
current research also provides novel insights and unique contributions. Firstly, as 
discussed in the methodology section, no previous research has examined the 
construction of distress in media specifically targeted at women who are 
demographically most over-represented in common psychiatric diagnoses. The 
interpretive repertoires identified in the data may therefore be of particular 
relevance to this group of women and the way in which they experience and 
express distress.  
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A further aspect of the analysis worth noting in this section was the seeming 
contradiction with which particular interpretive repertoires were used. For 
example, even when distress was constructed as a normal and understandable 
reaction to a highly aversive experience, it was often simultaneously described 
with a psychiatric or symptomatic framework (see section 3.1.1.1.). This arguably 
reflects the contradictory views commonly held by lay people, which are often 
mediated by occupational background (Rogers & Pilgrim, 1997). This is of 
particular importance given that the conceptualisation of distress held by an 
individual will influence their response to distress. In addition, Rogers and Pilgrim 
(1997) report that discrepancies in conceptualisations of distress between mental 
health professionals and service users are associated with lower satisfaction in 
services.  
 
Finally, another striking finding in this research was the absence of Clinical 
Psychology as a discipline despite such frequent references to misery and 
distress. Whilst frequent references were made to ‘counselling’, and two 
references to ‘cognitive behavioural therapy’, no explicit mention was made to 
Psychology or Psychologists or other models of talking therapy. This lack of 
representation may be highly significant given the promotion of biomedical 
explanations of distress and lack of ‘critical’ alternatives. Consequently, this lack 
of representation was one of the key drivers of my argument that Clinical 
Psychologists need to engage more with the media, and in particular media 
targeted at those who are most disadvantaged or most over-represented in 
mental health services (see section 4.2.4.1.).  
 
In this research I also sought to make an explicit contribution by reflecting on the 
implications of this research for clinical practice and further research. My hope is 
that by deconstructing and exposing the interpretive repertoires and rhetorical 
devices used to justify psychological and psychiatric explanations of distress, I 
have been able to offer valuable reflections on the potentially harmful implications 
of these constructions, and the alternative constructions that remain hidden. 
Specifically, I have sought to expose the medicalization and ‘psychologisation’ of 
difficult life experiences and social inequalities, and reflect on the way in which 
women are routinely constructed as passive to their experiences and in need of 
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help from professionals. On this basis I hoped to propose useful insights into how 
harmful messages in the media can be challenged and alternative constructions 
of distress can be publicised and celebrated. In particular I have advocated for 
critical Clinical Psychologists to engage with the media, and I hope that I have 
provided a convincing argument for this by highlighting the lack of representation 
Clinical Psychology had in this widely read data sample and the power of media 
discourses. I also sought to provide valuable recommendations for clinical 
practice that will be have a meaningful impact on women using mental health 
services.  
 
4.3.3.1.1. Generalizability 
 
As discussed previously, this study has not been conducted with the aim of 
claiming generalizability. However, as highlighted in the introductory section of 
this thesis, the potential power exerted by the media in shaping our conceptions 
of distress suggests that it may be valuable to consider the impact that the 
discursive objects in the text may have on the reader (Davies, 2013; Grabe, Ward 
& Hyde, 2008; Howitt, 1982; Kalafetalis & Dowden, 1997). This is particularly the 
case given the extent to which the findings from this study are supported by the 
literature (Blum and Stracuzzi, 2004; Gattuso, 2005; Metzl & Angel, 2004 & 
Ussher, 2010). In addition, as highlighted previously, according to Sacks (1992a) 
and McCarthy and Rapley (2001), it is likely that the examination of ‘fragments of 
a culture’ will elicit findings that can be found elsewhere within the same culture. 
In accordance with this view, it is likely that the constructions of distress identified 
in this research are also identifiable in other contexts.  
 
4.3.3.2. Credibility 
 
Credibility refers to the plausibility of the research (Spencer & Ritchie, 2012). To 
demonstrate the credibility of my research, I have sought to be as transparent as 
possible about the process of my data analysis, including an explicit description 
of the process used (in the methodology section), as well as an example extract 
of data analysis in Appendix 2 (section 5.2.). This was included to demonstrate 
categorisation and the identification of rhetorical devices and linguistic strategies. 
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During the analysis I have also included numerous extracts from the data to 
illustrate and support claims made, and have also made efforts to be explicit 
about why I have made particular claims and refer to relevant supporting 
evidence in the literature. In addition, in an attempt to demonstrate credibility I 
have also included examples in the data which do not fit directly with the key 
categories presented, for example, the example of a challenge to stigma and 
secrecy in the subsection ‘Responsibility to keep quiet: secrecy, shame and 
protecting others’, and the challenge to efficacy of psychopharmacological 
treatment in the subsection ‘Hardship, trauma and the need for support’. 
 
4.3.3.3. Rigour 
 
Rigour refers to methodological validity, including the appropriateness of 
research questions, the dependability of evidence and the general safe conduct 
of research (Spencer & Ritchie, 2012). In order to demonstrate how I considered 
the rigour of my research, I will discuss how I managed issues of reflexivity and 
ethics and the defensibility of my research choices below. 
 
4.3.3.3.1. Reflexivity 
 
It is inherent to qualitative research that the researcher will influence and shape 
the research process (Willig, 2013). Throughout the process I have been aware 
that as a feminist and critical psychologist, I may be drawn to particular 
interpretations in the data that fit with my values. I became interested in this 
particular research project due to my own experiences of gender inequality, my 
passion for critical approaches to psychology and my personal and professional 
relationships with women. In particular, when working as an Assistant 
Psychologist on a women’s inpatient ward, I became very curious about the way 
in which both staff and residents very readily pathologised the emotional 
experience of residents. Professionally, I have been particularly influenced by 
critical academics including Jacqui Dillon, David Smail and Mary Boyle, who 
fiercely defend the position that we should look at a person’s experiences and the 
socio-political contexts that surround them to understand distress. 
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Whilst acknowledging that these values will have influenced my research, I have 
made efforts throughout the process to reflect on my assumptions. In conducting 
DA, the researcher is encouraged to notice and consider their reactions to the 
text (Wood & Kroger, 2000). Whilst this is in part to facilitate the researcher to 
identify the stance taken and the rhetorical devices deployed, this must also be 
considered within the context of the researchers own assumptions (Wood & 
Kroger, 2000). Throughout the analysis I have therefore made claims about the 
functions of discursive devices and wider implications tentatively. I also made 
efforts to be transparent about my interpretations and to search for and include 
examples in the data which did not necessarily fit with a critical approach.  
 
4.3.3.3.2. Defensibility 
 
Rigour also refers to the defensibility of approach in design (Spencer & Ritchie, 
2012). In an effort to demonstrate this I have aimed to be transparent about my 
decisions with regards to data collection and methodology. As discussed in the 
introduction section of this thesis, I chose the particular magazine ‘Take a Break’ 
because it was the best-selling (and therefore probably most widely read) 
women’s weekly magazine that specifically targets women who, demographically, 
are most over-represented in common psychiatric diagnoses. I also discussed in 
some detail in my methodology section my reasons for drawing on DP and CDA. 
Firstly, this type of analysis allowed me to examine medicalization of women as 
an identified social problem whilst also allowing me to attend to the ‘micro’ and 
‘macro’ levels of social constructionism. In addition, by allowing me to expose 
potentially harmful discursive practices, this type of analysis leant to itself to 
active recommendations for change. As discussed in the ‘credibility’ section, I 
also evidenced my analytic steps with an example extract in Appendix 2 (section 
5.2.) of this thesis.  
 
4.3.4. Ethical Considerations 
 
As discussed in the methodology section of this thesis, no participants were 
recruited for the purpose of this research project and the data used is publicly 
available, so issues of deception, consent and confidentiality do not apply. Willig 
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(2012) highlights three other ethical concerns for consideration when carrying out 
qualitative research. These include: keep in mind the research question and be 
modest about what the research can reveal; ensure the participant’s voice is not 
lost and remain open to alternative interpretations. I will not describe each of 
these sections in detail here, as I have discussed these in some detail in other 
sections of this critical review. However, to summarise, I have kept the research 
question in mind throughout and discussions with colleagues and my director of 
studies has aided this process. I have attempted to be modest about my claims of 
generalizability and what the research can reveal. I have used extracts 
throughout the analysis in order to be transparent about the content of the data 
and demonstrate how I reached my particular interpretations. I have endeavoured 
to remain open to alternative interpretations and have actively sought out data 
that challenges my assumptions and values.  
 
4.4. Final Summary and Concluding Comments 
This research demonstrates that, at least in the magazine under study, normal 
life experiences for women are being medicalized and pathologised. A number of 
rhetorical devices are used to make this particular construction of distress 
persuasive, including the frequent use of corroboration (Edwards & Potter, 1992) 
in ‘agony-aunt’ style articles and empiricist and biomedical discourse positioning 
information as factual. This finding echoes much of the research evidence 
discussed in the introduction section of this thesis, which suggests that dominant 
discourses about distress in mainstream media negate socio-political factors and 
instead serve to individualise distress (Blum and Stracuzzi, 2004; Gardner, 2003; 
Gattuso et al; Hansen, McHould & Rapley 2003; Metzl and Angel, 2004; Ussher, 
2010).  
 
Examined within a historical context, this can be seen to follow a long tradition of 
the pathologisation of women’s experiences of distress (Russell, 1995; Ussher, 
2010), positioning them as more ‘vulnerable’ or ‘maladaptive’ in their coping 
(Hänninen & Aro, 1996; Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson, and Grayson, 1999) and 
ignoring the social context of gender inequality (Stoppard, 2000; Ussher, 2010). 
As discussed, the pathologisation of women can been seen to benefit the 
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powerful in multiple ways, including establishing a rationale for Clinical 
Psychology and Psychiatry (Boyle, 2011; Smail, 2011), earning profits for self-
help industries and magazines, as well as pharmaceutical companies (Davies, 
2013; Hansen, McHoul & Rapley, 2003) and maintaining women within ‘self-
sacrificing’ roles that benefit men and governmental bodies.  
 
Throughout this research I have sought to expose the discursive practices used 
to construct distress in ways that legitimises the above power abuses. On the 
basis of this evidence and supportive evidence in the literature, I have gone on to 
argue for a number of innovative interventions involving both research and 
clinical practice. I have argued that such interventions could be used to directly 
challenge harmful constructions of distress and meaningfully addressing the ‘real’ 
of distress experienced by women by directly acting upon the socio-political 
antecedents or determinants of distress (Smail, 2011; Stoppard, 2000; Ussher, 
2010). My hope is that this research will provide some useful insights for Clinical 
Psychologists moving forward in the battle against sexual inequality.   
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6. APPENDICES 
6.1. Appendix 1: Literature Search Strategy 
With regards to my literature search, I was initially interested in two broad areas: 
gender differences in psychiatric diagnosis, and constructions of distress and 
mental health in the mass media. I conducted my searches using the major 
online database ‘EBSCO’, and within this I specifically searched the databases 
‘Communication and Mass Media Complete’, ‘PsychARTICLES’, ‘PsychINFO’ 
and ‘PubMed’. I chose to search ‘PsychARTCLES’ and ‘PsychINFO’ as I was 
specifically interested in articles relevant to Clinical Psychology and mental 
health. Similarly, given the focus on medicalization of distress, it was also 
deemed appropriate to search the ‘PubMed’ database, which includes research 
in medicine and healthcare. Finally, I decided to include the database 
‘Communication and Mass Media Complete’ because I also had a specific 
interest in the portrayal of distress and wellbeing in the media, and it was decided 
that expanding my search outside the health database might yield novel and 
relevant results.  
 
In addition to the use of the above databases, I also used ‘Google Scholar’. This 
was deemed appropriate because relevant data can sometimes be found here 
that is not accessible from the above databases, for example, reports from the 
World Health Organisation (WHO). In addition I did a library search for relevant 
books which may provide an overview of the topics. Finally I also looked up 
potentially relevant references from articles and books identified through the 
above searches. 
 
I began my search by conducting a literature review on gender disparities in 
mental health. To accomplish this, I used the following search terms: 
 
 Gender mental health 
 Gender disparities mental health 
 Gender differences mental health 
 Gender mental illness 
 Gender disparities mental illness 
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 Gender differences mental illness 
 Gender psychiatric diagnosis  
 Gender disparities psychiatric diagnosis 
 Gender differences psychiatric diagnosis 
 Sex differences mental health  
 Sex differences mental illness 
 Sex differences psychiatric diagnosis 
 Women mental health 
 Women mental illness 
 Women psychiatric diagnosis 
 
Much of the literature found on the basis of this search focused primarily on 
depression, so in an effort to gain a better insight into gender differences in other 
common psychiatric diagnoses (primarily anxiety), I also used search terms 
including various combinations of ‘anxiety’, ‘sex differences’, ‘gender differences’ 
and ‘gender disparities’. Relevant articles were identified by reading abstracts 
and downloading full articles. I excluded articles that were not directly relevant to 
the research question. For example, in an article by Vogt (2014), the focus was 
on gender differences in mental health post-deployment in a war-zone. Due to 
the specificity of the context focused on in this study, it was not deemed to be of 
relevance to overall or epidemiological gender differences in common psychiatric 
diagnosis.  
 
I then began a targeted search on constructions of distress in the mass media. 
To conduct this search I used the same databases and strategies, but used 
different combinations of the following search terms: ‘Depression’, ‘Anxiety’, 
‘Mental health’, ‘Mental illness’, ‘Gender’, ‘Women’, ‘Psychiatric diagnosis’, 
‘Media’, ‘Constructions’, ‘Newspapers’, ‘Magazines’, ‘Stigma’, ‘Television’ and 
‘Mass media’.  Again, I also did a library search for relevant books and looked up 
potentially relevant references from articles and books identified through the 
searches. 
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6.2. Appendix 2: Example of a Worked Transcript 
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6.3. Appendix 3: Ethical Approval 
ETHICAL PRACTICE CHECKLIST (Professional Doctorates) 
 
SUPERVISOR:  Helen Murphy  ASSESSOR: Anna Butcher 
 
STUDENT: Stephanie Phillips   DATE (sent to assessor): 09/06/2014 
 
Proposed research topic: The Overrepresentation of Women in ‘Common’ Psychiatric Diagnoses: 
Do Women’s Magazines Play a Role in Marketing Psychiatric Explanations? 
 
Course: Professional Doctorate in Clinical Psychology 
 
 
 
1.   Will free and informed consent of participants be obtained?  N/A  
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